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COMMODITIES, ENERGY AND FINANCE:
INTRODUCTION, MAIN FINDINGS, AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
By Ernest Gnan and Már Gudmundsson
This SUERF study summarizes the main findings and features most of the 
contributions from a  workshop on “Commodities, Energy and Finance”, 
which was jointly organised by SUERF, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
and the Bankwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft at the OeNB’s premises in 
Vienna, on 3 March 2008. Over 100 participants from 16 countries followed 
a  day of discussions on the nature and dynamics of commodity markets, 
on the relationships between financial, commodity and energy markets in 
Europe, on the challenges of oil wealth and on how monetary policy should 
take commodity and energy prices into account. The workshop brought 
together both professional and academic perspectives as well as financial, 
microeconomic and central banking views on the channels of mutual influence 
between commodities and energy markets as well as financial markets.
In his opening remarks,  Klaus Liebscher (Governor, Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank) set the scene by identifying some of the key issues: first, 
ongoing and probably lasting shifts in the global supply of and demand 
for energy and commodities; second, massive increases in energy and 
commodity prices and their consequences for the economy; third, the search 
for yield and risk diversification in international portfolios and the resulting 
heightened role of financial motives in markets for commodities and energy. 
Despite the huge increase in commodities and energy prices, demand has so 
far not abated. Most of the additional demand will be supplied by countries 
in the Middle East, historically prone to political crises. In this situation of 
a continuing tight balance between the supply and the demand for oil, even 
small supply disruptions – be they of a technical or a political nature – trigger 
disproportionate price hikes. Europe is particularly dependent on imported 
gas.
Up to now, the macroeconomic effect of oil price shocks has been different 
from the 1970s, due to the absence of adverse concurrent shocks, a smaller 
share of oil in production, more flexible labour markets and improvements in 
monetary policy. In the euro area, the strong exchange rate of the euro has also 
dampened the effects of increased oil prices in terms of US dollars. Higher 6 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
oil prices can be seen as a wealth transfer from consumers in oil- importing 
countries to oil-exporting countries. A  big part of commodity and oil 
revenues have been recycled into global financial markets, among others, by 
sovereign wealth funds. This has added to global demand for financial assets, 
dampening interest rates and credit spreads. Where petrodollars have gone 
into real estate investment, they may also have contributed to unsustainable 
price developments. Financial investors have re-discovered commodities as 
an asset class.
Liebscher concluded by raising a  number of questions: Should monetary 
policy pay more attention to energy and commodity price developments? 
Should one try to separate fundamental from speculative price moves? Are 
petrodollars making monetary policy more difficult due to their dampening 
effect on interest rates? Is the world economy headed for a prolonged period 
of low growth combined with inflationary pressures, reminiscent of the 
1970s?
The first two sessions of the workshop dealt with the various interactions of 
physical commodity markets and financial markets. Session 1, which was 
chaired by Professor Beat Bernet (Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance, 
University of St. Gallen), explored the role of commodities as an asset class 
and explained why investors increasingly regard commodities as a  useful 
addition to investment portfolios.
Geert Rouwenhorst (Professor of Finance, Deputy Director of the 
International Center for Finance, Yale University) has done pioneering work 
on commodity futures as an asset class. In his presentation on “Facts and 
Fantasies about Commodity Futures”
1 he made the important, and sometimes 
forgotten, distinction between taking direct exposure to actual commodities 
and investing in commodity futures. The commodity futures contract is an 
insurance contract where the investor receives compensation for bearing 
the risk of short-term commodity price fluctuations.
2 The expected return to 
the investor is the difference between the current futures price and expected 
future spot price, which can be seen as a  risk premium. In addition, the 
1 No paper of this presentation is included in this volume. The presentation was based on 
two papers: Gorton, Gary B. and Rouwenhorst, K. Geert, “Facts and Fantasies about Commodity 
Futures” (February 28, 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-20. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=560042; and Gorton, Gary B., Hayashi, Fumio and Rouwenhorst, K. Geert, “The 
Fundamentals of Commodity Futures Returns” (June 2007). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 07-08 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996930.
2 The investor in commodity futures does not have direct exposure to the commodity and 
generally does not take delivery of it.7 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
investor can have unexpected gains or losses in as so much as the actual future 
spot price turns out to diverge from the expected future spot price. Professor 
Rouwenhorst showed that that the average return of commodity futures 
between 1959 and 2006 at 11% was almost equal to that of stocks. At the same 
time, commodity futures have historically been less risky than stocks, both 
in terms of volatility and downside risk. Long-term analysis has also shown 
that the returns on commodities futures are negatively correlated with the 
returns of stocks and bonds. The negative correlation is stronger over longer 
holding periods. Furthermore, commodity futures have performed better in 
periods of inflation, especially unexpected inflation, when stock and bond 
returns have generally disappointed. These features predestine investment 
in commodities futures as a  means of portfolio diversification, especially 
in times of unexpected inflation. Professor Rouwenhorst then proceeded to 
explain the fundamentals of commodity futures. He showed that inventory 
levels are a fundamental driver of commodity futures risk premiums as low 
inventories increase the (expected) volatility of future spot prices. Investors 
in commodity futures should thus expect to earn more to accept the risk of 
increased price volatility. As a result, high spot prices, caused by demand or 
supply shocks, should increase the difference between spot and futures prices. 
Since inventories cannot be replenished instantaneously, low inventories, and 
consequently higher risk premia, should persist.
John Cavalieri (Vice President and Real Return Product Manager, PIMCO), 
in his presentation on “Why Commodities? Why Now? How? How 
Much?”
3 took the perspective of a practitioner in commodity investments. He 
emphasized the continued potential of commodities to enhance returns and 
diversify risks in an environment of increasing world commodity demand, 
supply constraints and a secularly weak US dollar. Specifically, he addressed 
issues such as how much to invest in commodities and how investors actually 
implement their exposures. In particular, he advocated using commodity 
indexes, since they allow the most systematic approach to this asset class 
by capturing the inherent returns on commodities as reflected by economic 
factors specific to the asset class. By contrast, according to him, various 
alternatives to commodity indexes suffer from the following drawbacks: 
owning actual commodities is impractical; the return on shares in commodity 
producers is affected by factors other than commodity prices; and traditional 
active commodity trading (“managed futures”) loses the inherent return of 
the asset class. The return on commodity indexes is driven by the T-bill 
3 No paper of this presentation is included in this volume. For further details on some contents 
of the presentation see Chapters 5 and 6 of Greer, Robert, The Handbook of Inflation Hedging 
Investments, McGraw-Hill, 2006.8 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
rate (which reflects inflation expectations and the real interest rate), the risk 
premium due to price uncertainty, a rebalancing component, the convenience 
yield (resulting from low inventories relative to demand) and “surprises”. 
According to PIMCO’s estimates, to achieve minimum portfolio volatility, 
commodities should make up a share of 7%, with another 5% being invested 
in stocks, 87% in TIPS and no conventional bonds.
Session 2, chaired by Ernest Gnan (Secretary General, SUERF, Senior 
Advisor and Head of Economic Analysis, OeNB) looked at how the activity 
of financial investors may affect commodity markets. That in turn raises 
two issues. First, how financial activity in commodity markets affects 
price dynamics, in particular the degree to which it drives commodities 
and energy prices away from fundamentals. Second, whether commodity 
markets become more complete and liquid through derivatives markets. 
Alexandra Heath (Senior Economist, Bank for International Settlements) in 
her presentation on “Financial Investors and Commodity Markets” showed 
that the presence of financial investors in commodity markets has increased 
considerably over the past few years. To take an example, in addition to 
investing in traditional commodity futures (cf. the paper of Rouwenhorst) 
financial investors have the option of investing in exchange-traded funds, 
which allow them to purchase shares in a stock of a physical commodity. 
The range of instruments and strategies employed in commodity trading, has 
thus broadened substantially and financial investors have improved the depth 
of commodity markets. Commodity markets have for these reasons partly 
become more like financial markets regarding motivations and strategies of 
market participants. However, fundamentals such as inventory levels and 
the marginal cost of production still provide strong anchors for commodity 
prices. But a lack of liquidity and physical limits to short selling in the spot 
market may at times significantly affect short-term market dynamics.
Michael Lewis (Global Head of Commodities Research at Deutsche Bank, 
London) in his talk on “The Battle between Commodity Fundamentals and 
Speculative Activity”
4 provided insights into the practice of commodities 
trading and price dynamics. He explained the factors which drive the forward 
prices of commodities, which are determined as the sum of the spot price 
and the interest rate, reduced by the difference between the convenience 
yield and storage cost. By storing, rather than selling a  commodity, one 
surrenders the spot price and incurs interest and warehousing costs. Offsetting 
these costs are the benefits of holding inventory, the so-called convenience 
4 No paper on this presentation is included in this volume.9 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
yield. The latter is the flow of services and benefits accruing to an owner of 
a physical commodity but not an owner of a contract for future delivery of the 
commodity, such as a secure supply of raw materials and hence the avoidance 
of costs from stock-outs. Thus, when inventories in a  certain commodity 
decline, the convenience yield will rise and push the forward curve into 
backwardation, which is a situation where the forward price is below the spot 
price. Comparing various commodities, one finds that convenience yields 
are higher, the higher the ratio of daily consumption over stocks is (which 
is a  measure of precariousness). For example, if gold production ceased 
completely, it would take 40 years for the world to exhaust available gold 
reserves on the basis of current consumption patterns. At the other extreme, 
if oil production ceased today, the consequences would be felt within days if 
not hours.
The availability of commodity-linked financial instruments can affect the 
value of firms that use these instruments. For example, US airline firm value 
and credit ratings have been shown to be positively related to their use of 
hedging against fuel price changes. Conversely, consumer hedging activity 
has flattened commodity forward curves over the past few years. Speculative 
activity has increased across all commodity sectors over the past few years. 
Funds tracking commodity indexes have surged since 2003. Contrary to 
the often made assertion that this has inflated commodity prices, distorted 
the shape of the commodity forward curves and elevated levels of implied 
volatility, an IMF study found that there is little to support the notion that 
speculative activity affects either price levels over the long run or price 
swings in the short term; speculators tend to be price followers rather than 
price setters – so, causality runs from spot and futures prices to speculation, 
and not vice versa. Financial markets have been particularly fond of trend 
following trading rules such as the Moving Average Crossover Trading 
(MACT) model, which recommends to buy when the short run moving 
average of a commodity moves above the long run moving average, and to 
sell in the opposite case. The profitability of technically-based momentum 
trading strategies in commodity markets has improved significantly over the 
past few years, reflecting trending markets. Problems with such strategies 
arise, though, in markets with little price variation.
Regarding future oil price trends, Lewis estimated that finding and development 
costs in the oil industry have risen by 15% p.a. in real terms between 2005 
and 2007. Assuming a further rise of at least 10% p.a. over the years to come 
implies R&D costs of USD 25/bbl in 2010 and USD 30/bbl in 2015. Since 
1995 the oil price tended to equal approximately 3.5 times the R&D cost. 10 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
This would, according to Lewis and taking into account some margin of error, 
imply a “fair value” for crude oil in 2010 of USD 65-88/bbl. In mid- 2007, 
the crude oil term structure had moved from steep contango (spot price 
below forward price) to backwardation (spot price above forward price). This 
was attributable to a reduction in OPEC and specifically Saudi Arabian oil 
production.
In conclusion, Lewis agreed with the other speakers that physical rather than 
financial factors are the ultimate drivers of commodity prices. However, 
financial flows can overpower fundamentals at certain points in time. This 
may distort spot prices and forward curves and increase volatility. At the 
current juncture, he saw a  serious risk of price overshooting, particularly 
in precious metals markets, given that financial market turbulences have 
lured more investors into commodities and given the historically observed 
relation between USD exchange rate overshooting and precious metals price 
movements.
Session 3, chaired by Doris Ritzberger-Gruenwald (Head of Foreign 
Research, OeNB) had a closer look at the state of play of energy markets in 
Europe. It investigated how well the markets for trading energy across Europe 
have been developed so far and to what extent liberalisation and privatisation 
have enhanced competition and lowered prices for consumers and businesses. 
A number of remaining challenges to build a true integrated energy market 
for Europe were identified. Many economic and political developments 
depend partly on them, such as productivity growth, inflation or energy 
security. Juan Delgado (Research Fellow, BRUEGEL, Brussels) highlighted 
the constraints of the common EU energy market by technical and political 
factors as well as the growing prominence of energy efficiency and climate 
considerations. The road to a full liberalisation of EU energy markets has still 
a long way to go. More than a decade after liberalisation began, the European 
energy sector is still highly concentrated, cross-border energy trade is limited 
and price levels differ substantially across countries. The dependence of 
gas and electricity on physical networks for distribution and the difficulties 
to store them support market fragmentation. The heterogeneity of market 
designs and the lack of coordination of system operators are further obstacles 
to market integration. At the political level, the protection of cheap domestic 
energy sources, the promotion of national champions and of bilateral supply 
agreements to guarantee national supply and national climate change policies 
add to market fragmentation. The adoption of the recently proposed Third 
Liberalisation Package would facilitate market entry and cross-border 
interconnection. However, political opposition by some governments to some 11 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
crucial provisions such as network unbundling might severely water down its 
impact. A proposed reform of the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) after 
2012 would, however, remove obstacles to the common energy market. Further 
progress towards an integrated EU energy market will require resolution of 
conflicts of interest between global efficiency and national interests, since 
the distribution of benefits from integration may not be evenly distributed. 
A single market for energy is also the basis for a common, efficient approach 
to the EU’s measures against climate change.
Walter Boltz (Managing Director, Energie Control, Vienna) explained how 
wholesale energy markets in Europe work in practice. Markets continue to 
be fragmented and to be mostly national in scope. The level of development 
differs strongly across EU countries. Congested long-distance transmission 
lines also hamper market integration. Lack of investment in this infrastructure 
is also due to incumbents’ interest to keep competitors out of their traditional 
markets. With increasing energy trading activity, prices established on 
energy marketplaces become of crucial importance for energy traders and 
for retail energy suppliers. Higher electricity and natural gas prices have 
put energy wholesale markets in the public limelight. Initiatives for regional 
energy market integration, while useful, are only voluntary and cannot solve 
structural market barriers. The EU Commission’s 3rd Energy Liberalization 
Package bears large potential for consumer gains. Its central elements are 
the ownership unbundling of the transmission networks and an enhanced 
regulatory framework including the establishment of an EU regulatory 
agency. The success of this package and of the EU’s internal energy market 
crucially depends on the courage and commitment of EU Member State 
governments. The proper functioning of the EU energy market is crucial for 
industry, small businesses and household consumers alike.
Session 4, chaired by Peter Mooslechner (Director for Economics and 
Research, OeNB) addressed the role and management of sovereign wealth 
funds, and the possible challenge posed to oil exporting countries by the risk 
of two track parts of the domestic economy or Dutch disease. Birger Vikøren 
(Director, Financial Market Department, Norges Bank) discussed important 
features of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund—Global. One of the 
largest oil and gas exporters in the world, petroleum makes up 25% of total 
Norwegian production, nearly 40% of state revenues, and half of Norwegian 
exports. The country’s oil production has already passed its peak. High 
petroleum production and oil prices have contributed to the strong growth 
of the Fund that has existed since the mid 1990s and reached a total size of 
USD 400 billion by end-2007. It is projected to reach USD 800 billion by 12 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
2014. The objectives of the Fund are intergenerational justice and economic 
stabilization. Contrary to what might be surmised from its name, the Fund 
is not earmarked for future pension expenditure. However, its return is 
designed to continually support the budget and pension expenditures will 
make up a considerable part of fiscal expenditure in the future. Oil revenues 
as well as the returns on financial investments flow into the Government 
Pension Fund; in turn, the non-oil fiscal deficit is financed out of the Fund. 
A guideline approved by Parliament in 2001 implies that the fiscal deficit 
financed out of the Fund should on average not exceed 4% of the Fund 
(which is roughly the expected real return on the Fund). Formally owned by 
the Ministry of Finance, operational management of the Fund is delegated 
to the Norges Bank. Thus, the Ministry decides on the strategic benchmark 
and Norges Bank maximizes returns relative to the benchmark. Parliament 
is regularly informed on the outcome. In its 10-year history the Fund has 
yielded an average real return of 4½%. Governance of the Fund is highly 
transparent, creating strong confidence among the general public, a  vital 
condition for lasting public acceptance. The Fund’s investment strategy aims 
at maximizing the international purchasing power in the long run. The aim 
of high return at moderate risk entails a strong weight for equity and broad 
international portfolio diversification; the Fund holds no large or strategic 
ownership stakes in individual companies. The Fund has issued its own 
Ethical Guideline, which for instance excludes investment in companies 
producing weapons, companies contributing to serious violations in human 
rights or severe environmental damage.
Vasily Astrov (Economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies) described the Russian Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF), which was 
established in 2004, as a tool of fiscal stabilisation and monetary sterilization. 
By the end of 2007, the Fund had reached nearly 12% of Russia’s GDP. The 
OSF accumulates funds as long as the world oil price exceeds a  cut-  off 
price (initially USD  20 but increased to USD  27 from 2006). The Fund 
collected revenues from a portion of the export duty on crude oil and from 
a  mineral resources extraction tax on oil, and also parts of the recently 
strongly increasing federal budget surplus (which resulted from deliberately 
conservative oil price assumptions) were transferred to the Fund. Initially 
held entirely in Russian rubles, the Fund was recently converted into foreign 
currency sovereign bonds of 14 developed countries (45% EUR, 45% USD, 
10% GBP), held indirectly via deposits at the Central Bank of Russia. A recent 
reform implemented as of February 2008, split the original OSF into two 
Funds, one continuing the roles and functions of the OSF (fiscal stabilisation 
and monetary sterilization), the other having the aim of saving wealth for 13 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
future generations. The concrete accumulation and investment strategy for 
the latter fund (“National Welfare Fund”) is currently under development. In 
this context, Astrov pointed to risks, as more spending could fuel overheating 
and corruption.
In a  similar vein, Simon-Erik Ollus (Economist at the Bank of Finland 
Institute for Economies in Transition, Helsinki), in a  presentation of his 
paper co-authored by Stephan Barisitz (Economist, OeNB), discussed signs 
of Dutch disease in the Russian economy, as oil and gas revenues contribute 
substantially to GDP and dominate export revenues.
5 Comparing Russian 
industrial import growth with domestic industrial production growth between 
2002 and 2006, he found for most manufacturing sectors that Russian imports 
expanded faster than domestic output. In some sectors, imports have even 
exceeded domestic production. The paper concludes that Russia may be 
facing incipient deindustrialization at least in some parts of the manufacturing 
sector. Russia might therefore be showing some signs of a Dutch disease.
Session 5, chaired by Már Gudmundsson (Deputy Head, Monetary 
and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements) discussed 
implications for monetary policy. The panel consisted of Irma Rosenberg 
(First Deputy Governor, Sveriges Riksbank), Ulrich Kohli (Alternate 
Member, Governing Board, Swiss National Bank) and Frank Smets (Deputy 
Director General Research, European Central Bank). The panel addressed 
several issues facing monetary policy makers associated with commodity and 
energy prices: How should monetary policy react to changes in commodity 
and energy prices? What is a better indicator of underlying inflation, core 
inflation measures excluding commodity and energy prices or headline 
inflation that includes them? How should commodity and energy prices be 
taken into account in measuring core inflation? Are commodity and energy 
prices leading indicators of economic activity and inflation developments? 
The panel broadly agreed on a number of issues. First, the goal of monetary 
policy should be price stability, which means that monetary policy should 
target headline inflation. However, as commodity price increases are relative 
price changes it depends on the nature of the shock driving theses changes 
what the appropriate monetary policy response should be. Are these supply 
shock or demand shocks, are they temporary or likely to be long lasting? 
The answers to questions would also determine whether core or headline 
measures of inflation were better indicators for future inflation and thus for 
5 A Dutch disease is a term used for a situation where a resource enhancement or a rise in 
commodity prices produced by a country leads to a real exchange rate appreciation, undermining 
the competitiveness of manufacturing and other trading goods sectors.14 Introduction, main findings, and some conclusions
the setting of monetary policy. In all cases monetary policy has to prevent the 
transmission of relative price changes from affecting longer term inflation 
expectations and thus giving rise to so-called second round effects where 
wages and other input costs would start to rise in order to compensate for 
higher relative prices of commodities and energy. Interestingly, the point was 
made that the magnitude and likelihood of second round effects depends on 
the credibility of low inflation targets, which in turn might depend on the 
response to the first round effects. Thus the distinction between first and 
second round effects is no longer clear cut. At the time of the workshop the 
inflationary impact from higher oil and other commodity prices had been 
mild, possibly due to higher central bank credibility and lower real wage 
rigidity than in the past. However, it could be that central banks’ low inflation 
policy is only now being put to the test.
*   *   *
The workshop produced many interesting insights, although challenges 
remain. In particular, it highlighted the multiple relations between commodity 
and energy markets, on the one hand, and financial markets, on the other. 
However, it is still difficult to determine in real time whether commodity 
price developments are driven by fundamentals or financial activity, in other 
words, speculation. The optimal monetary response is also an issue for further 
investigation.
Higher and more volatile energy and commodity prices pose multiple 
challenges for producers, consumers, financial intermediaries and policy 
makers. Careful evaluation is required to draw appropriate conclusions 
and devise adequate strategies in reply to these developments. In a longer 
term perspective, the analysis has to go beyond the traditional confines of 
economic analysis to produce wise and sustainable decisions. To fully capture 
the problems at hand, and provide lasting solutions e.g. to ensure long-term 
sustainable growth in a world of limited natural resources, a much broader, 
interdisciplinary approach is required.
As usual, SUERF’s approach of bringing together academics researchers, 
financial practitioners and policy makers, proved useful in exposing the many 
facets of a complex topic and in providing synthesis of possible routes to 
follow in the future.15
OPENING REMARKS 
By Governor Klaus Liebscher
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I  am very pleased to welcome you to this workshop jointly organised by 
SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum – and the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. As many of you may know, SUERF and the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank have cultivated close ties for many years, with the OeNB hosting 
the SUERF General Secretariat. It is therefore a great pleasure for me to see 
that this close cooperation again takes concrete shape in today’s conference.
I would like to thank the organisers for having put together a very interesting 
set of sessions around a highly topical issue: the link between commodities, 
energy and finance, which has come to the forefront in recent years.
My special thanks, of course, goes to the distinguished speakers and panellists 
who have come to Vienna – in some cases even over the Atlantic! Thank 
you in advance for your contributions, which certainly will provide valuable 
insights and food for thought!
Drivers of the debate are, first, ongoing and probably lasting shifts in the global 
supply and demand of energy and commodities; second, massive hikes in 
energy and commodity prices and their consequences for the economy; third, 
the search for yield and risk diversification in international portfolios and the 
resulting financialisation of the markets for commodities and energy. It goes 
without saying that for me as a policy-maker who is primarily concerned with 
price stability, the link between monetary policy and today’s topics is crucial.
Recent developments in commodities and energy prices are indeed staggering. 
The average market price of oil for the year 2007 was USD 73 per barrel, 
as compared to USD 25 in 2002, a tripling in 5 years. In spite of this, oil 
demand is not falling. On the contrary, the International Energy Agency 
projects a further growth in demand by 2.3% for 2008, mostly driven by 
India and China. Most of this incremental demand will be supplied by 
countries in the Middle East, historically prone to political crises. In this 
situation of a continuing tight balance between the supply and the demand 
for oil, even small supply disruptions – be they of a technical or a political 
nature – cause disproportionate price hikes. Europe is particularly dependent 
on imported gas, which is projected to reach 67% of total gas consumption 16
by 2030. Concerning commodities, over the last three years, the price of 
gold has doubled; over the last four years, the price of platinum has also 
doubled. World market prices of agricultural commodities such as wheat have 
increased considerably since early 2006.
Which financial and economic consequences should we expect? In principle, 
higher raw material prices dampen world growth and raise inflation. Up to 
now, the macroeconomic effect of oil price shocks has been different from the 
1970s, due to a combination of factors such as a lack of adverse concurrent 
shocks, a smaller share of oil in production, more flexible labour markets and 
improvements in monetary policy. 
In the euro area, the strong exchange rate of the euro has also considerably 
dampened the dollar price hike of oil. Higher oil prices can be seen as a wealth 
transfer from consumers in oil-importing countries to oil-exporting countries, 
as the elasticity of substitution is low in the short term. 
The majority of these revenues have been recycled into global financial 
markets, among others, by so-called sovereign wealth funds. At a price of 
USD 70 per barrel, it is projected that the total stock of petrodollar foreign 
assets would grow to almost USD 7 trillion by 2012. This has for some time 
added to global demand for financial assets, dampening interest rates and credit 
spreads. Where petrodollars have gone into real estate investment, they may 
also have contributed to unsustainable asset price developments in certain real 
estate segments. Financial investors have re-discovered commodities as an 
asset class. What does all of this mean for monetary policy? Should we pay 
more attention to energy and commodity price developments? Should we try to 
separate fundamental from speculative price moves? Are petrodollars making 
monetary policy more difficult due to their dampening effect on interest rates? 
Are we headed for a prolonged period of low growth combined with inflationary 
pressures, reminiscent of the 1970s? Many questions need further research, but 
I hope that today’s workshop will shed light on some of the issues raised.
I wish you interesting discussions and useful insights, both from an academic 
point of view and from a practitioners´ angle. It is the combination of those 
two perspectives that allows progress in our understanding of the economy 
and of the appropriate policy responses.
SUERF has a long-standing tradition of combining the two aspects in a most 
fruitful and useful manner. I  am certain that also today’s workshop will 
continue in this traditionFINANCIAL INVESTORS AND COMMODITY MARKETS
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Abstract
Commodities have attracted considerable interest as a financial investment in 
recent years. This article discusses the factors behind their growing appeal and 
assesses the extent to which market characteristics, such as price volatility, 
have changed as a result. The feature concludes that commodity markets have 
become more like financial markets in terms of the motivations and strategies 
of participants, but that the physical characteristics of commodity markets are 
still important.
1 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the BIS. We are grateful to Clara Garcia for her assistance with updating a previous 
version of this paper that was published in the March 2007 BIS Quarterly Review.
191. Introduction
The sharp increase in commodity prices, especially for energy and base 
metals since 2002, has gone hand in hand with growing derivatives market 
activity (Graph 1). The number of contracts outstanding in exchange-traded 
commodity derivatives almost tripled from the end of 2002 to mid-2007. 
Over-the-counter (OTC) trading of commodity derivatives also grew rapidly. 
According to BIS statistics, the notional value of commodity OTC derivatives 
contracts outstanding reached USD 7.5  trillion in mid-2007, more than 
18 times the value in 1998 (BIS (2007)). At the same time, the share of 
commodities in overall OTC derivatives trading grew from 0.5% to 1.6%. 
Along with the strong growth in commodity derivatives trading, the presence 
of financial investors in commodity markets has become more significant over 
the past few years. While commodity market investment is still small relative 
to overall managed funds, it is large relative to commodity production. In 
addition, there are indications that the types of financial investors and the 
strategies they employ have changed.
These developments raise the question of whether growing investor presence 
has altered the character of markets that are of key importance for the global 
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Graph 1: Commodity prices and derivatives activity
1
1 1998–2002 average = 100. 
2 Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) sub-indices, monthly averages. 
3 Number of contracts outstanding, in millions. 
4 Notional amounts deflated by the GSCI. 
Sources: Datastream; BIS.economy. Understanding the nature of the changes in investor types and 
strategies is an important step in this regard. The first part of this article 
documents the increasing role of financial investors in commodity markets, 
while the second looks at the effect these changes may have had on the 
dynamics of commodity prices. Although commodity markets have become 
more like financial markets in terms of the motivations and strategies 
of participants, physical characteristics, such as inventory levels and the 
marginal cost of production, remain important anchors for prices. 
21 The presence of financial investors in commodity markets2.  The presence of financial investors in commodity 
markets
Financial activity in commodity markets is large compared with the size of 
physical production and has grown much faster in recent years. For copper, the 
volume of exchange-traded derivatives was around 50 times larger than physical 
production in 2006 – a significant increase in this ratio from 2002 (Table 1). 
For gold and aluminium, this ratio also increased, albeit more modestly from 
around 20 in 2002 to around 30 in 2006. The lower ratio for crude oil may 
understate the relative size of financial activity, given that OTC markets are 
particularly important for this commodity. Bank of England market contacts 
suggest that up to 90% of swaps and options trading in oil are done over 
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Table 1:   Indicators of financial and physical activity in selected commodity markets 
in 2006
 





2002 2006 2002 2006
Volume
1 % chg since 
2002
Volume
1 % chg since 
2002
Crude Oil: NYMEX 71.1 55.4 21.0 83.4
67.0 73.5 3.2 13.9
 ICE 44.3 106.3 0.0 -77.4
Gold: TOCOM 22.2 8.4 0.0 -
2.6 2.5 21.8 25.6
 COMEX 15.9 76.5 3.7 90.3
Aluminium: LME 36.4 63.1 4.7 434.6
26.1 33.7 22.7 32.6
 SME 13.9 491.4 - -
Copper: LME 18.9 13.8 1.9 108.4
15.3 15.1 30.5 52.2
 SME 5.4 -7.0 - -
Note:   NYMEX = New York Mercantile Exchange; ICE = IntercontinentalExchange, United Kingdom; 
TOCOM = Tokyo Commodity Exchange; COMEX = New York Commodities Exchange; 
LME = London Metal Exchange; SME = Shanghai Metal Exchange.
1 Number of contracts, in millions. 
2 Oil: thousands of barrels per day; gold: millions of kilograms; 
aluminium and copper: millions of tonnes. 
3 Defined as financial activity in the two largest contracts 
converted to units of physical production, divided by production.
Sources: Commodity Research Bureau, The CRB Commodity Yearbook; US Geological Survey.the counter, reflecting the need for tailored contracts and a lack of organised 
derivatives markets for certain types of crude oil (Campbell et al (2006)).
Traditionally, specialised financial traders in commodity markets focused on 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities (Kolb (1997)). Typically, such opportunities 
arise as the consequence of commercial investors seeking to hedge their 
production or consumption in futures markets. These arbitrage trades, usually 
conducted by specialised commodity traders, typically involve taking long 
or short positions in forward markets for specific commodities and offsetting 
positions in spot markets.  In doing so, financial investors provide liquidity in 
commodity derivatives markets. 
Normally in financial markets, opportunities for (risk-free) arbitrage exist 
when the futures price deviates from the relevant spot price plus the cost of 
carry, e.g. the cost of financing a position in the spot market. However, the 
scope for arbitrage in commodity markets may be limited by constraints on 
short selling. In particular, the stock of commodities available for lending is 
generally small for energy and base metals. This limitation allows the futures 
price to fall below the spot price – a  situation known as backwardation 
(Duffie (1989)).
The current upturn in commodity prices has been accompanied by greater 
variety in the types of financial investors and investment strategies in 
commodity markets (Holmes (2006)). One rapidly growing area is passively 
managed investment and portfolio products, which is consistent with 
investors now viewing commodities as an attractive separate asset class. By 
mid-2006, around USD 85 billion of funds were tracking the Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index (GSCI) and the Dow Jones/AIG Index, two important 
commodity indices (Holmes (2006)).
Passively managed investments often pursue a fully collateralised long- only 
futures strategy. This can be attractive to institutional investors with 
a longer- term investment horizon, such as pension funds, for several reasons 
(Beenen (2000)). First, this strategy allows diversification into commodities 
at a relatively low cost. Historically, commodity prices have had a relatively 
low correlation with prices in other asset classes and a high correlation with 
inflation (Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004)).
2 Second, these authors also 
2 It is important to note that these calculations are all in US dollars and therefore the correlation 
between commodity prices and exchange rate movements is not a consideration. To the extent that 
commodity prices are in US dollars and other assets in the portfolio under consideration are not, 
currency hedging may be important for obtaining diversification benefits.
23 The presence of financial investor0s in commodity marketsprovide evidence that, historically, the return on a diversified basket of long 
commodity futures has been comparable with the return on other asset classes 
with similar risk features, such as equities.
Several authors have emphasised the importance of the so-called roll return 
from a long position in commodity futures as a component of total returns 
(Erb and Harvey (2005), Feldman and Till (2006)). Indeed, roll returns are 
an important explanation for why the average return on commodity futures 
has exceeded the average return from holding spot commodities (Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst (2004)). Investors earn a positive roll return if they can roll over 
a futures contract that is close to expiry into a new contract at a lower price. 
This occurs when the spot price (to which the price of the original futures 
contract converges over time) is higher than the price of the new futures 
contract, i.e. in a backwardated market.
Roll returns can be considerable. For example, in the crude oil market, the 
roll yield from purchasing three-month futures was about 14% per annum 
over 2003–04 (Graph 2). However, roll returns became negative when the 
price of the futures contract rose above the spot price, i.e. the market moved 
into contango, in 2005. Essentially, the profitability of strategies aimed at 
generating positive roll returns depends on the persistence of the factors that 
cause markets to backwardate, including low levels of commodity stocks 
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Graph 2: Crude oil prices and roll returns
1 In US dollars per barrel. 
2 Annual returns from rolling over consecutive three-month futures at maturity 
in excess of spot price returns.
Sources: Bloomberg; BIS calculations.available for short selling and positive returns received by owners from 
holding the physical commodity (the so-called convenience yield).
The presence of investors with a shorter-term focus, such as hedge funds, 
has also increased considerably during the past three years. The number 
of hedge funds active in energy markets has reportedly tripled to more 
than 500 since the end of 2004, with an estimated USD 60 billion in assets 
under management (Fusaro and Vasey (2006)). The USD 6 billion loss on 
natural gas derivatives that the hedge fund Amaranth reportedly incurred 
in September 2006 is a further indication of the size of positions that hedge 
funds take in commodity markets. Another group of investors that has 
become increasingly important are managed money traders (MMTs). This 
group includes specialised investors such as commodity pool operators and 
funds advised or operated by commodity trading advisers. Data available for 
the crude oil and natural gas markets show that the average number of MMTs 
trading roughly doubled between 1994 and 2003–04, and their share of total 
open interest in each of these markets has increased (Table 2). In addition, 
assets under management by commodity trading advisers are significant and 
rose from about USD 20 billion in 2002 to about USD 75 billion by end-2005 
(IMF (2006)).





MMT open interest as %







Crude oil Average 40 80 Long 6.4 14.0
Maximum 48 100 Short 2.2 6.9
Natural gas Average 33 66 Long 2.3 11.9
Maximum 44 81 Short 7.0 15.4
1 Daily averages and maximums. 
2 In futures and options markets. 
3 April-September 1994.
4 August 2003-August 2004.
Sources: CFTC (1996) ; Haigh et al (2005).
The variety of investment instruments has increased over time, partly as 
a result of increased demand from a more diverse investor base. For example, 
the number of exchange-traded funds (ETF), which allow investors to purchase 
shares in a stock of a physical commodity, has increased significantly since 
the first ETF for gold was opened in 2003. GFMS estimate that in 2006 around 
40% of gold held for investment was held in ETFs (Koh (2007)). Because 
25 The presence of financial investors in commodity markets ETFs allow investors to effectively purchase the physical commodity, they 
can potentially have a direct impact on market fundamentals in a way that is 
not possible through instruments such as exchange traded structured notes, 
which are pure derivatives. The introduction of a silver ETF in 2006 is widely 
regarded as being an important factor behind a  doubling of silver prices 
(Koh (2007)). A related area of growth is the development of instruments 
that facilitate the implementation of more complex strategies, including 
cross- market arbitrage or taking positions on volatility (McNee (2006)).
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Graph 3: Total open interest and shares of non-commercial holdings













1 Number of contracts, in thousands. 
2 Ratio to total open interest, in per cent. 
3 Non-commercial 
long positions. 
4 Non-commercial short positions.
Source: CFTC.An important source of quantitative information on trading activities in 
commodity markets is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
which publishes weekly data on the open positions in US futures markets 
of commercial and non-commercial traders (Graph 3). The non-commercial 
trader group includes participants who are not primarily using the market 
for hedging, and encompasses a  variety of subgroups. In 2003–04, the 
non- commercial trading category for both natural gas and oil was dominated 
by MMTs, and therefore is likely to capture most financial investors who are 
operating in centralised commodity markets (Haigh et al (2005)). The share 
of non-commercial traders across all US commodity futures markets has gone 
up from about 17% in the second half of the 1990s to almost 25% in 2005–07. 
This increase is mainly attributable to an upward trend in the share of long 
positions held by non-commercial investors over 2002 and 2003.
While this broad pattern holds across markets, the share of non-commercial 
positions varies considerably: this share is reported to be particularly high in 
metals markets. In addition to the evidence provided by the CFTC data, index 
funds and hedge funds account for 85% of trading volumes on the London 
Metal Exchange (Koh (2007)). Between March 2006 and the beginning of 
2007, the share of open interest attributed to non-commercial traders fell by 
almost 3 percentage points. This is consistent with a withdrawal of investors 
during a period of falling commodity prices, but also with an increase in the 
hedging activity of commercial producers (JPMorgan (2007)).
The available evidence also supports the notion of a rapidly growing presence 
of financial investors in OTC derivatives markets. IntercontinentalExchange 
(ICE) reports that hedge funds, locals and proprietary trading shops accounted 
for almost one third of trading commissions paid on OTC transactions 
conducted through ICE in 2005, compared to less than 5% in 2003 
(Table 3). However, this increase might in part reflect the higher propensity 
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Table 3: Participants in OTC trading on the ICE
OTC participants’ trading
(as % of total commissions) 2003 2004 2005
Commercial companies 64.1 56.5 48.8
Banks and financial institutions 31.3 22.4 20.5
Hedge funds, locals and proprietary
trading shops 4.6 21.1 30.7
Source: I CE  (2006).of institutional investors, in particular hedge funds, to use electronic trading 
platforms such as ICE (Davidson (2006)). These numbers may therefore 
overstate the increase in financial investor participation in commodity 
markets as a whole.
The results from a simple empirical exercise are broadly consistent with the 
view that the motivations for investing in commodity markets have changed 
along with growing presence of financial investors (Domanski and Heath 
(2007)). Based on regressions seeking to explain movements in CFTC open 
interest data for the crude oil, natural gas, gold and copper markets, this 
exercise comes to four broad conclusions. First, shorter-term factors reflecting 
return considerations appear to have become, on balance, more important 
over time. Second, the volatility of futures returns has had a negative effect 
across markets, which is consistent with a growing importance of leveraged 
investors speculating on short-term price trends, as this group is particularly 
sensitive to short-term price fluctuations. Third, the share of non-commercial 
net long positions appears to have been less influenced by perceived 
diversification benefits than in the past. Finally, there are indications that the 
size and character of financial investor activity differs considerably across 
markets.
28 Financial investors and market dynamics3.  Financial investors and market dynamics
Changes in the scale and character of involvement of financial investors in 
commodity derivatives markets may have affected the price dynamics of 
these markets. The first question in this regard is whether the exploitation 
of perceived profit opportunities by financial investors has fundamentally 
changed the relationship between prices and the physical characteristics 
of commodity markets. The second issue is whether the broadening of the 
investor base has led to significant market deepening and hence affected 
features such as short-term price fluctuations.
3.1. The relationship with physical commodity markets
Intuitively, one might expect large inflows of funds into commodity markets 
to cause prices to rise sharply, possibly to higher levels than are justified 
by economic fundamentals. The prima facie evidence seems to support this 
view, as financial activity has broadly increased in parallel with prices during 
the past four years. However, the results of empirical work on the impact of 
the growing presence of financial investors on commodity prices are less 
clear-cut. Several recent studies, which explore the relationship between 
investor activity and commodity prices, indicate that price changes have led 
to changes in investor interest rather than the other way around (Haigh et al 
(2005), IMF (2006)).
This section uses the physical characteristics of specific commodities as 
a rough benchmark for assessing whether the increased presence of financial 
investors has altered price dynamics. Constraints on supply and storability 
affect the prices of commodity derivatives. In the longer run, production can 
be changed and the elasticity of commodity supply depends on the marginal 
costs of production. In the short run, supply from production is relatively 
inelastic and depends more on above-ground stocks. With the exception of 
gold, above-ground commodity stocks are small relative to demand. For 
example, it is usual for four to six weeks of demand to be held in inventories 
for base metals. For gold, in contrast, stocks either available for production 
or for lease represent close to 45 years worth of demand, depending on how 
this is measured (O’Connell (2005)).
29 Financial investors and market dynamicsGraph 4: Prices and marginal costs
1 (Daily data, 1998–2007)
1 The bold lines have been constructed by averaging the prices at each tenor within each time period. 
The thin lines represent the futures curves associated with the minimum and maximum spot prices 
within each time period. 
2 In US dollars per barrel. 
3 In US dollars per tonne.
Sources: Bloomberg; Goldman Sachs Research; JPMorgan Chase; BIS calculations.
In efficient markets, the expected marginal costs of commodity production 
should act as an anchor for longer-run futures prices. Consistent with this, the 
long ends of oil and copper futures curves have overall tended to fluctuate 
much less than spot and short-dated futures prices (Graph 4). The tenors that 
are affected by this “anchoring” may vary, depending on the time needed to 
adjust production. For instance, from 1998 to 2002, a period of ample spare 
capacity, marginal costs were steady and production could be expanded at 
relatively short notice. Indeed, futures prices at tenors from about one year 
were quite closely aligned with estimates of marginal costs of production in 
both oil and copper markets over this period.
Since 2003, however, long-dated futures prices have increasingly diverged 
from estimates of current marginal costs. In 2006, prices for two-year oil 
futures were on average about 20% higher than the measure of marginal 
costs shown in Graph 4. In the case of copper, the deviation was much 
larger. Several factors related to economic fundamentals could cause such 
a deviation. For example, a sharp increase in expected marginal costs owing to 
buoyant demand growth and uncertainty about the costs of further expansion 
of production in the face of capacity constraints may have been a factor in 
the oil market. Moreover, the need to explore and develop new sources has 
probably lengthened the time required to extend production.
30 Financial investors and market dynamicsIn addition, futures prices are likely to embody risk premia, not least because 
long-dated futures markets are typically relatively thinly traded. Reluctance by 
producers to forego upside opportunities through hedging in an environment 
of rising prices might have further reduced liquidity. In contrast, there is some 
tentative evidence that the size of the risk premium in oil futures markets is 
positively related to the share of net non-commercial long positions in the oil 
market, controlling for other factors (Micu (2005)). Notwithstanding all these 
factors, it still appears difficult to reconcile the increases in futures prices until 
mid-2006 with economic fundamentals, especially in the case of copper.
Graph 5: Inventories and the slope of the futures curve
1 Spot price minus three-month futures price; for oil, in US dollars per barrel; for copper, in US dollars 
per tonne.
Sources: Bloomberg; London Metal Exchange; BIS calculations.
A second physical anchor is inventories, which link current and future supply 
and consequently connect the spot price and expected spot prices in the 
future (Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004)). It is not clear that growing investor 
activity can have a  systematic direct effect on inventory decisions: the 
convenience producers derive from holding stock depends on factors related 
to real activity such as production smoothing. Indeed, the strong historical 
relationship between the slope of the futures curve for non-gold commodities 
and the level of physical inventories has remained intact (Graph 5).
It is more likely that financial investors could indirectly affect inventory 
decisions through futures prices. To the extent that taking long positions in 
futures markets increases futures prices, the value of holding inventories for 
31 Financial investors and market dynamicsfuture delivery increases. The effect on the slope of the yield curve remains 
open, depending on how spot prices respond to possible inventory decisions.
3.2. Market depth
The second question is whether the increase in the size and diversity of 
financial investors has increased market depth. Greater market depth would 
imply that transactions of a given size cause smaller fluctuations and, other 
things equal, that short-term price volatility should decline. The prima facie 
evidence on changes in commodity price volatility is mixed. Price volatility 
has declined in the oil market, especially in the shorter maturities of futures 
contracts where trading is particularly active (Graph 6). In contrast, it has 
increased in the copper market.
Graph 6: Volatility of commodity futures prices
Sources: Bloomberg; BIS calculations.
Another approach is to look at the interaction of the trading behaviour of 
commercial and non-commercial traders. Non-commercial traders will add to 
market depth if they contribute to a two-sided market. This is the case if they 
act as counterparties to commercial traders’ hedging transactions or if they 
take positions offsetting other financial investors.
The pattern of changes in the open positions of commercial and
non-commercial traders supports the view that financial investors have, overall, 
32 Financial investors and market dynamicscontributed to deeper markets.
3 First, a higher correlation between changes 
in non-commercial long and commercial short positions has been associated 
with lower volatility in oil markets (Graph  7, left-hand panel). However, 
the correlation has not significantly increased since 2002, suggesting that 
a growing presence of financial investors may have accommodated increased 
hedging needs, but not fundamentally altered the character of the market.
Graph 7: Volatility and correlation
1 The x-axis is the correlation between the changes non-commercial long positions and commercial 
short positions: the y-axis is the standard deviation of the spot oil prices. 
2 Correlation between the 
changes in non-commercial long positions and non-commercial short positions; 12-month moving 
average.
Sources: Bloomberg; CFTC; BIS calculations.
Second, there is also some evidence that non-commercial traders have, as 
a group, increasingly taken positions on both sides of commodity markets. 
Prior to 2002, changes in long and short positions of non-commercial traders 
were negatively correlated on average for copper, oil and natural gas: an 
increase in long positions typically went hand in hand with a reduction of 
short positions and vice versa. There is also some evidence that MMTs tended 
to act on the same side of the market at similar times in the past (CFTC 
(1996)). In the past few years, however, the correlation between changes in 
long and short positions of non-commercial traders has increased and become 
positive (Graph 7, right-hand panel). Evidence that non-commercial players 
3 In order to gauge the position-taking of the investor groups on both sides of the market, we 
consider correlations of long and short positions separately (i.e. we do not calculate net long or 
short positions).
33are increasingly trading between each other is also provided by the growing 
share of spread positions, which arise when a trader takes long and short 
positions in the same commodity at different tenors of the futures curve.
The emergence of trading among financial investors in commodity markets 
on a  substantial scale suggests that the determinants of market liquidity 
may become more similar to those in traditional financial markets. These 
determinants include, for instance, the amount of risk capital that financial 
investors allocate to commodities trading and the heterogeneity of opinions 
of market participants. One key risk in both regards is a high concentration of 
trading activity. The demise of Amaranth, which led to a sharp deterioration 
in liquidity conditions in those tenors of the natural gas futures market 
where the firm held extensive positions, provides a clear indication of these 
challenges.
344. Conclusion
The presence of financial investors in commodity markets has increased 
considerably during the past four years or so. While it is difficult to be 
precise about the exact magnitude and composition of inflows, there is much 
evidence that the investor base, and with it the range of instruments and 
strategies employed in commodity trading, has broadened substantially. It 
is not clear to what extent these changes reflect structural shifts in investor 
behaviour or a temporary boom supported by a “search for yield”. In any 
case, a full reversal of the trend towards a greater role of financial investors 
appears unlikely against the backdrop of greater investor sophistication and 
a broadening range of commodity-related financial instruments.
Commodity markets have become more like financial markets in some 
respects. Financial investors are increasingly active on both sides of trades, 
creating a kind of financial trading sphere. Yet the characteristics of physical 
markets, such as inventory levels and the marginal cost of production, are 
still important. A lack of liquidity especially in the long tenors of commodity 
derivatives markets and physical limits to short selling in the spot market may 
at times significantly affect market dynamics. These effects require further 
investigation.
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1. Introduction
The road to full liberalisation of EU energy markets has still a long way to go. 
More than ten years after the process started, the energy sector in Europe is still 
highly concentrated, cross-border trade in energy is limited and prices differ 
substantially from country to country. European energy markets are poorly 
integrated not only because of the technical difficulties attached to energy markets 
but also because of the weak political support to the process of integration.
This paper highlights the main obstacles to integration of EU energy markets 
and analyses briefly the potential impact on market integration of the new 
legislation recently proposed by the European Commission in the fields of 
energy and climate change.
The existing conflicts between, on the one hand, increasing global efficiency 
derived from further integration and, on the other, national interests have to 
be addressed explicitly if the EU wants to continue making progress in the 
process of liberalisation.
1 This note is an update version of the presentation made at the SUERF / OeNB Workshop on 
“Commodities, Energy and Finance” in Vienna on 3 March 2008.
412.  A Common Market for Energy?
Despite the process of liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation started 
by the European Commission in the mid-1990s, energy policy in the EU 
has traditionally remained a national issue. The European energy sector has 
remained fragmented not only due to the technical complexity of energy markets 
and to the geography of Europe but also due to the lack of political initiative at 
national level to eliminate obstacles to market integration. Despite the technical 
difficulties of establishing and managing large energy markets, there is still 
scope for further regional integration and overall price convergence.
The current picture of the EU energy sector is very fragmented. The energy mix 
differs substantially from country to country which stems from different policy 
priorities and concerns. Prices for gas and electricity also differ greatly.
The European energy mix is composed of sixty percent oil and gas, twenty 
percent coal, fourteen percent nuclear and six percent hydro, renewable and 
other sources of energy. The energy mix however varies substantially across 
EU states. For example, forty percent of France’s energy consumption is 
nuclear energy while gas only represents fifteen percent of the primary energy 
consumption. By contrast, in Germany, gas and coal constitute almost fifty 
percent of the total primary energy consumption and nuclear energy represents 
slightly above ten percent. This means that the concerns and priorities of 
France and Germany differ. While France is keen on expanding its nuclear 
base, Germany has a phase-out plan for nuclear energy and is looking to 
secure its gas supplies and promote the use of its domestic coal reserves and 
its renewable resources. Energy mix differs from country to country and so 
do each country’s policies and priorities.
In addition, energy dependence on non-EU countries also differs as well as the 
origin of energy imports. For example, eighty percent of the energy consumed 
in Spain is imported (mostly gas and oil) while for Germany this figure is 
slightly above sixty percent. The origin of such imports is diverse. Germany 
obtains half of its gas imports from Russia while Spain’s gas imports come 
mostly from Algeria and Nigeria. The lack of interconnection between the 
German and the Spanish gas markets implies that the external policy priorities 
of both countries regarding gas differ. Given the different degree of import 
dependence and the diversity in the origin of imports, it is difficult to find 
common interests amongst EU countries for their external energy policies.
42What determines the energy mix? The energy mix is primarily determined 
by geographical factors and the availability of natural resources (e.g. the 
abundance of lignite in Germany and Poland, hydro resources in Nordic 
countries and Austria and biomass in Sweden and Finland) but also by 
political decisions. For example, the reaction of EU countries to the 1970s 
and 80s oil crisis or to the Chernobyl accident varied substantially. Sweden, 
for example, promoted heavily the investment in renewable energy after the 
first oil crisis. In 1980, after a national referendum, Sweden decided to phase 
out nuclear power. Italy decided, after the Chernobyl disaster, to shut down its 
four nuclear power plants. Other European countries such as Spain, Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium have decided to phase-out their nuclear 
programmes. On the other hand, France, Finland and several new member 
states have active nuclear programmes. Also, the share of renewables in the 
energy mix does not only depend on the availability of resources but also 
on the existence of specific policies to support the deployment of renewable 
technologies. Germany, for example, has in place generous policies to support 
renewables which have resulted in a rapid deployment of wind mills and 
solar panels. The level of commitment of different governments to implement 
climate change policies also contributes to determine the energy mix.
A common price for energy would indicate the existence of a common market 
for energy. Prices for gas and electricity differ however substantially across 
Europe. Wholesale gas prices are in most European markets determined by 
indexation mechanisms (mainly to oil and oil derivatives). Only a small share 
of gas is traded in the three main trading hubs NBP, Zeebrugge and the TTF. 
As reported by the European Commission’s recent sector inquiry on energy
2, 
prices determined by indexation mechanisms differ from hub prices. In 
general, long-term contracts indexed to oil are much less volatile than those 
indexed to hub gas prices. There are no signs of price convergence, which 
shows the limited arbitration possibilities between different markets due to 
the lack of interconnection.
In the case of electricity, prices also diverge across the EU both at wholesale 
level
3 but mostly at consumer level. Retail prices for different countries differ 
substantially even where wholesale prices are similar as is the case for France 
and Germany.
2 DG Competition report on the energy sector inquiry, 10 January 2007, paragraph 310. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html
3 See Figure 38 in page 11 of the sector inquiry.
43 A Common Market for Energy?3.  Obstacles to a Common Energy Market
The obstacles to a common market for energy can be either of a technical or 
of a political/economic nature.
The technical barriers have to do mainly with the characteristics of energy. 
First, energy relies on a physical network which makes markets less liquid 
and adds technical complexity in the operation of markets. This implies some 
inherent tendency of energy markets – mainly gas and electricity markets – 
towards regional fragmentation. Electricity is non-storable and transportation 
is economically feasible only over limited distances. Non-storability of 
electricity strengthens the above-described tendency towards regional 
fragmentation. More importantly, it even creates strong interdependence 
between regions with respect to the operation of the grid: network operators 
have to be closely coordinated in order to make trade possible.
The reliance on a network and the existence of geographical barriers do not 
always permit trade between different regions. This is for example the case 
of the UK or Ireland whose insular situation limits their interconnection with 
the rest of Europe. The Iberian Peninsula is also to a certain extent isolated 
from the rest of Europe.
However, not only is physical interconnection scarce but it is also, in many 
cases, underutilised. For example, some cross border interconnections in 
Europe are not governed by market mechanisms such as auctioning of capacity 
and market splitting which makes the operation of such interconnections 
suboptimal.
4 In many instances, existing cross-border interconnections 
do not respond to economic criteria but to arbitrary reliability criteria 
defined by system operators on each side of the border. Even in the cases 
where market mechanisms are in place, different market designs at each 
side of the interconnector mean that the result is not always efficient. For 
example, the sector inquiry reports that in 2004 for 40 percent of the hours 
the interconnection capacity between Germany and the Netherlands was 
allocated in the direction Germany-to-Netherlands even if prices in Germany 
where higher than in the Netherlands.
5
4 See pages 184-185 of the sector inquiry.
5 See sector inquiry, paragraph 552.
44The existence of multiple uncoordinated Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) and the existence of different market designs in different countries 
also make cross- border trade difficult. For instance, the different imbalance 
settlement periods (for TSOs to balance the market) across EU countries limit 
the possibility to trade across different regions.
But perhaps the most important obstacles are of a political and economic 
nature
6. The degree of implementation of the liberalisation directives and of 
competition law differs from country to country. Some governments have 
favoured the emergence of national champions arguing that they help to secure 
their energy supplies. There are several recent examples throughout Europe 
(e.g. E.ON/Ruhrgas in Germany in 2003, the failed acquisition of Endesa 
by Gas Natural in Spain in 2006 and the ongoing merger between Gaz de 
France and Suez in France/Belgium) where governments have promoted the 
creation of large national champions, thereby reducing competition, arguing 
that such mergers and takeovers promote supply security and investment. 
In many cases, governments also keep substantial economic interests in 
energy companies which might constrain business decisions and might be an 
impediment to the acquisition of such firms by private investors. The French 
EDF and GDF, the Italian ENEL, the Swedish Vattenfall and the Hungarian 
MVM are examples of dominant players where the respective states hold 
substantial stakes.
The integration of markets might also not be politically desirable for some 
governments especially in those countries that have relatively cheap energy 
sources. In a market where prices are determined by the marginal technology, 
market integration might cause a  price increase in the country with the 
lowest cost marginal technology. Even if the global outcome of integration 
is more efficient, the uneven distribution of the gains might discourage 
some governments from pursuing further integration. This could be the case 
of France, where full integration with neighbouring countries might cause 
an increase in the price of electricity since most technologies have higher 
marginal costs than nuclear energy which is predominant in France.
With the argument of securing national supply, governments might favour 
bilateral agreements between their energy companies and foreign suppliers 
and limit the interconnection with other countries in order to make sure 
that gas remains within the national borders. An example of this strategy 
6 See Röller, Lars-Hendrik, Juan Delgado and Hans Friederiszick. Energy: Choices for 
Europe. Bruegel Blueprint Series. March 2007. Available at www.bruegel.org
45 Obstacles to a Common Energy Marketis the Baltic Sea Nordstream gas pipeline that links Russia with Germany, 
bypassing other European countries.
Finally, some of the current measures to fight climate change such as the 
policies to support the deployment of renewable energies have a national 
character and might contribute to the fragmentation of energy markets. For 
example, higher subsidies for renewable energy in a specific country might 
increase the cost of electricity and might cause prices to differ from country 
to country. Equally, investment decisions can be distorted by the existence 
of different mechanisms to support renewable energies and by the different 
allocation of emission permits in the context of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
46 Obstacles to a Common Energy Market4.  What Do the Latest Proposals for Energy Regulation 
Mean for Market Integration?
With the aim of increasing the efficiency of energy markets, fighting climate 
change and securing Europe’s energy supply, the European Commission 
published in March 2006 a Green Paper on energy
7. After the 2007 Spring 
Council gave its green light to the proposals made by the Commission 
on the basis of the Green Paper,
8 the European Commission released on 
19  September 2007 the so-called ‘Third Liberalisation Package’
9 and on 
23 January 2008 the so-called ‘Climate Action’ package.
10
The Third Liberalisation Package aimed to further liberalise the energy sector 
in Europe and to increase the interconnection between EU energy markets 
in order to promote further market integration. The Climate Action package 
aimed to implement in Europe a comprehensive policy architecture to fight 
climate change.
The third package proposed the structural separation of the activities of 
transmission and generation (in the case of electricity) and supply (in the case of 
gas) in order to guarantee non-discriminatory access to networks. The package 
g r a n t s  m o r e  p o w e r s  t o  n a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t o r s ,  i n c r e a s e s  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
regulators and establishes coordination mechanisms for system operators.
The adoption of the third package would imply a step forward in the process 
of liberalisation by deepening the opening of markets at domestic level, by 
facilitating cross-border interconnection and by improving the conditions 
of access to networks. However, the political consensus to push it forward 
does not seem to exist. The proposals of the Commission are not new but the 
momentum did not exist when the first and second liberalisation packages 
were adopted. 
Does the momentum exist now? The main controversy around the third 
package is the network unbundling proposal. Eight countries (France and 
7 Green paper on “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, 




47Germany amongst them) presented recently a ‘third way’ to proceed with 
the liberalisation process.
11 The so-called third way does not go beyond 
a proper implementation of the previous liberalisation package and excludes 
unbundling as a remedy.
The prospects of reaching a political agreement on this issue were poor. In 
fact, on 6 June 2008, the EU energy ministers accepted the “third way”, 
allowing electricity companies to be vertically integrated with separate 
management for generation and transmission activities. However, new policy 
developments have created new expectations for the progress of liberalisation: 
the German power company E.ON has recently proposed to commit to sell 
its electricity transmission system network to an operator which would have 
no interest in the electricity generation structural remedies to settle ongoing 
antitrust cases in the electricity sector.
12 The Commission has a number of 
ongoing cases in the energy sector that might result in new settlements 
contributing to the further opening of the energy sector despite the opposition 
of some governments.
 
On the climate change policy side, the European Commission has recently 
proposed a directive reforming the ETS after 2012
13 and a directive on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
14 The proposed 
reform of the ETS emphasises its European character by replacing national 
allocation plans by a European plan which reduces the distortions created by 
the existence of different permits allocation criteria. In addition, by increasing 
the share of permits that are auctioned, the efficiency of the allocation 
mechanism is improved. However, the mechanisms to promote the deployment 
of renewable energies continue to be mostly national in scope. The directive 
foresees a system of trade by which states can meet their targets by acquiring 
renewable certificates in other countries. Although trade in targets in theory 
favours efficient investment and guarantees the implementation of the least 
costly alternative, in practice, there are many restrictions to trade in the current 
proposal (e.g. trade is conditional on countries having met a share of their 
targets and trade should be authorised by the governments of the exporting 
and importing countries) which make the scheme not very flexible and do not 





14 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion 
of the use of energy from renewable sources. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0019:FIN:EN:PDF
48 What Do the Latest Proposals for Energy Regulation Mean for Market Integration?Technological progress and other market developments can affect the process 
of market integration. For example, increasing scarcity and world competition 
for resources may trigger the adoption of protectionist measures in order to 
guarantee domestic supply. The turn to nuclear may loosen the dependence 
on fossil fuels and then reduce the incentives for protectionism. Investment 
in LNG terminals may increase the entry gates for gas in Europe, increasing 
the number of suppliers and making the European gas market more liquid. 
Also, the decrease in the cost of renewable energy might make subsidies 
unnecessary and therefore might reduce the fragmentation of policies.
49 What Do the Latest Proposals for Energy Regulation Mean for Market Integration?5. Conclusions
The progress towards a common energy market is constrained by the physical 
characteristics of energy and by political and economic factors. The reliance 
of gas and electricity on physical networks and the difficulties of storing 
them create a tendency to market fragmentation. The technical complexity of 
operating networks and managing markets limits the expansion of markets. 
Also, the heterogeneity of market designs and the lack of coordination of 
system operators constitute obstacles to cross-border trade of energy.
In addition to the technical issues, there are also political and economic factors 
that prevent the integration of European energy markets. The protection of 
cheap domestic sources of energy, the promotion of national champions and 
of bilateral agreements in order to guarantee domestic supply and the national 
scope of some climate change policies contribute to the fragmentation of 
European energy markets.
The adoption of the recently proposed Third Liberalisation Package would 
contribute to facilitating further market entry, cross-border interconnection and 
market integration. However, the political opposition by some governments 
to some of the crucial provisions of the proposal such as network unbundling 
has already severely watered down its ambitions. The climate change package 
also has implications for the common market for energy. While the reform 
of the ETS goes hand in hand  with the removal of obstacles to the creation 
of a  common energy market, the directive on renewable basically retains 
a national focus and, although it introduces some European instruments such 
as the possibility to trade targets, the way it is drafted does not seem sufficient 
to homogenise the different support mechanisms existing across Europe.
Making further progress in the process of integration will increasingly imply 
dealing with the conflict between national interests and global efficiency. 
Market integration increases global efficiency but the distribution of the total 
benefits might not be even. This might create incentives by less-favoured 
states to free-ride. New policy developments should consider how to bypass 
national incentives to guarantee domestic energy supply, to protect access to 
domestic sources of energy and to protect national industry from the impact 
of stricter environmental regulation. More crucially, the effective fight against 
climate change requires common action in order to make an effective use of 
the complementarities across states. A single market for energy is the basis for 
a common approach to EU climate policy. A common climate policy will not 
deliver if markets are fragmented and prices do not converge.
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Electricity market reforms around the turn of this century opened up 
closed markets to competition in the EU. These changes brought about the 
opportunity not only for customers to shop around for the best deal, but also 
made possible for suppliers to source electricity at the lowest possible cost. 
At the same time generators got the chance to sell their product to those who 
pay the most for it. As a result a number of wholesale marketplaces emerged 
throughout Europe during the last couple of years.
Well functioning wholesale markets are – among others – prerequisites for 
competitive retail markets to develop. As such, they facilitate the entry of 
new market participants by removing the need to act as an integrated utility 
company. Prices on these markets give also important signals for market 
participants to decide on optimal investment strategies in new generation 
assets, in consequence facilitating continuous security of supply.
532.  Where do we come from?
The level of development of wholesale markets differs greatly between 
European countries, to a  large extent reflecting the historical structure of 
the industry and the regulatory framework they work in. There is a long list 
of indicators against which we can measure the functioning of wholesale 
markets. In general they should offer a large number of short and long term 
products with an appropriate market depth with high traded volumes, which 
would enable market participants to trade efficiently at lowest possible costs. 
In order for this to happen there should be a large amount of equally sized and 
well informed market participants with inherently different trading interests, 
such as generators, pure traders and suppliers.
By looking around in Europe we find that these criteria only partly apply for 
the majority of the markets. Some are large enough but dominated by a single 
(France) or a small number of large players (Germany), others have a potential 
to evolve but plagued by omnipresent long term contracts (Hungary) and 
some few lucky are small in size (though heavily concentrated) and relatively 
well connected to their larger neighbours (e.g. Austria and to some extent 
Belgium).
In general, markets have a fairly good track record in regions where traded 
commodity markets have a long history and market reforms also included 
structural measures (UK) or where countries have long learnt to think in 
regional instead of national terms (Nordic region).
543.  Questioning of the current market framework
As long as markets offered acceptable prices imperfections did not seem to 
bother market participants and politicians. With strongly increasing prices 
since the mid of 2003 customers have started questioning some mechanisms 
and the prevailing market framework. They also alleged large generators of 
market wrongdoings and claimed that dominant players pushed up prices 
deliberately to cash in on customers.
These allegations mobilised decision makers and kicked of a  debate on 
a  number of issues. A  solid input to this discussion was supplied by the 
European Commission’s DG Competition carrying out the Energy Sector 
Inquiry, identifying serious market shortcomings. A good deal of problems 
highlighted concerns the functioning of wholesale markets, such as:
•  High market concentration
•  Insufficient market integration
•  Lack of transparency
554.  Where are we now?
It became apparent that on most of the markets few incumbent generators have 
dominant positions and, as a result, the potential to influence market prices. 
Whether such wrongdoings have really occurred is a subject of a number of 
ongoing investigations carried out by national competition authorities and the 
Commission itself.
Markets are also fragmented and mostly national in scope. Transmission 
lines connecting adjacent markets are often chronically congested preventing 
prices to even out between countries. Though scare transmission capacities 
are now allocated mostly in a  transparent manner to market participants, 
the level of available cross-border capacity has not changed much in recent 
years
1. This is inspite of significant congestion rents collected by transmission 
system operators (TSOs) which are supposed to be invested in the extension 
of the transport infrastructure. One reason for investment not taking place 
is, because it is not in the inherent interest of large incumbent players, who 
rather try to protect their vested generation interests by keeping potential 
competitors out their traditional markets. Since some of the major incumbent 
1 Technical capacity increased only by 1.1% from 2004 to 2006
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Figure 1: Allocated cross-border transmission capacities stagnate
Source: TSOs’ websites, E-Controlgenerators also happen to own the TSOs, progress on this issue can only 
be expected once this functional conflict of interest is relieved by effective 
structural measures.
Trust in the general functioning of the market has been weak also because in 
Continental wholesale markets a series of information is not made routinely 
available to all market participants. Especially generation related data are 
often kept as a business secret preventing asset light market participants from 
taking informed trading decisions. Thanks to mounting political pressure, the 
data release practice of incumbents has recently experienced some change. For 
example, formerly rather secretive German and Austrian generators started to 
post output related data on the European Energy Exchange’s website.
Nevertheless most continental wholesale markets made a fairly good progress 
in the last couple of years. Especially on the Dutch and German markets, 
traded volumes are fairly high on both, spot and forward markets and activity 
have been increasing on exchanges and OTC markets alike. 
Financial traders and smaller players continue to enter the wholesale 
marketplace; power exchanges add more and more regions to their portfolio 
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Figure 2: Development of day-ahead traded volumes in electricity on selected energy 
exchanges as a percentage of national consumption
Source: EU Commission - Energy Sector Inquiry, APX, EEX, Powernextand offer an increasing number of services to their customers. A  recent 
example of such activity is the planed merger of two important European 
energy exchanges, Germany’s EEX and France’s Powernext, creating a major 
Continental marketplace for power and gas transactions.
58 Where are we now?5.  Where do we go?
In order for wholesale markets to further develop and the single European 
market to ever become a reality some essential steps need to be taken. The 
problem of market concentration cannot easily be tackled. Whereas the 
ongoing merger drive of large utilities could be managed by increasingly 
vigilant competition authorities, both, on national and EU level, prevailing 
market structures – often a legacy of the past – can hardly be addressed by 
competition tools
2. Such structural measures are left to respective national 
governments which have – apart from very few examples – shown little 
interest in breaking up their incumbent utility(ies). In the last couple of years 
one could observe rather the opposite: governments became supportive of the 
anachronistic idea of national champions (e.g. in Poland and Spain).
5.1. The Regional Initiatives
A realistic way forward is a joint effort to enlarge the boundaries of national 
markets and let the incumbents play on a regional field. This was the thinking 
behind the Commission’s move to kick-off a discussion on the development 
of regional energy markets, which is now channelled by ERGEG
3 and led to 
the Electricity and Gas Regional Initiatives. These Initiatives try to identify 
existing barriers to entry and obstacles that hinder the development of the 
regional markets. Based on the findings propositions of concrete and practical 
improvements will be made to remove those obstacles, which subsequently 
have to be implemented by the respective TSOs and market operators. The 
work of the Electricity Regional Initiatives is built around 7 regions.
The regional groups have already established concrete action plans and have 
been reported back on subjects, such as proper management of congestions, 
calculation and allocation of scare interconnection capacities, improving 
market transparency and establishing of regional balancing markets. The 
focus of the work is currently on the co-ordination of the management of 
congestions and interconnection capacities by the TSOs of the regions. The 
goals already achieved within the regions reflect the historical differences 
between markets and their levels of development. Whereas in the Central-West 
2 An initiative to change this situation is currently underway in Germany, which would give 
the competition authority the power to take structural measures once it identifies major breaches 
of competition law.
3 European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (www.energy-regulators.eu)
59region (including Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) 
a  trilateral market coupling has already been established since November 
2006 with the involvement of the respective power exchanges and TSOs 
of France, Belgium and Netherlands, the Central-South region (including 
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Slovenia) could not yet go further 
than establishing co-ordinated explicit auctions, e.g. at 3 of the 4 Italian 
borders.
Steps towards the efficient management of transmission bottlenecks will 
certainly contribute to overall market efficiency but not solve the problem 
of chronically congested lines per se. Long administrative procedures as 
well as reluctance of insufficiently unbundled TSO have in the past seriously 
hampered the natural development of larger price regions. There is, however, 
slow progress, such as the development of connections between Norway and 
Netherlands and Norway and Germany or capacity developments between 
Germany and Netherlands or within the Nordic region itself.
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Figure 3: Groups of countries as defined by ERGEG’s Regional Initiatives
Sources: ERGEG and E-ControlSince the lack of transparency was an issue identified in the Commission’s 
Sector Inquiry as a major barrier to competition, regional groups have been 
keen on improving this situation. Current discussion has focused around the 
implementation of the mandatory transparency requirements of the Congestion 
Management Guidelines. As a first result of this process the Northern regional 
group produced an agreement on specifics of data that will have to be released 
to market participants. A couple of month ago also the Central-Western and 
Central Eastern groups followed. Such data will in particularly include timely 
and accurate information on load, transmission, interconnection, balancing 
and generation. Other regional groups have also taken this framework as 
a starting point for their respective transparency initiatives.
5.2. The 3
rd EU legislative package
The Commission’s yearly market assessments and in particular the findings 
of the Energy Sector Inquiry highlighted serious shortcomings of the internal 
energy market. Based on this the 2007 Spring European Counsel invited the 
Commission to propose further measures which are needed to speed up the 
process of market integration and are sufficient to bring about a true internal 
energy market. These measures include:
•   The effective separation of supply and production activities from network 
operation;
•   The further harmonisation of the powers and enhanced independence of 
the national energy regulators – Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER)
•   The establishment of an independent mechanism for co-operation among 
national regulators
•   The creation of a mechanism for TSOs to improve the co-ordination of 
networks operation and grid security, cross-border trade and grid operation 
– European Network of TSOs (ENTSO); and
•   Greater transparency in energy market operation
At the heart of this package are the measures proposed to effectively separate 
operation of the transmission network from other commercial activities of 
the incumbents. In this respect the Commission (and ERGEG) clearly spoke 
out for the so called Ownership Unbundling solution which they see as an 
ultimate structural measure to create a true level playing field for all market 
participants. This position has sparked a controversial debate between the 
stakeholders. Especially the governments of Germany and France have 
been strongly in support of the interests of their large incumbents, rejecting 
61 Where do we go?proposals involving any change in ownership rights. Their position has 
recently suffered a major blow, when the Commission’s Directorate General 
for Competition struck a deal with E.ON, whereby later agreed to sell of 
its transmission network to an undertaking not active in the generation 
and supply business and divest almost 5,000 MW of generation capacity 
in its home market. In exchange, the Commission would drop its running 
competition cases against the German major.
International examples show that ownership unbundling has proved itself as 
a reliable framework for efficient market functioning and enhanced security 
of supply by leaving room for independent and targeted infrastructure 
investment decisions.
Another central idea of the proposed package is the strengthening of the 
independence of the national regulatory authorities by giving them further 
powers, particularly in areas such as monitoring of TSOs’ unbundling 
compliance, reviewing their investment plans, monitoring of the level of 
competition and transparency obligations. Regulators shall also receive 
a formal mandate to co-operate at European level which would improve the 
currently applied voluntary approach. Experience shows that countries with 
long liberalisation history also tend to give their regulators the sufficient means 
and a high degree of independence they need to perform their regulatory 
duties properly, while others have only recently established regulators with 
powers that are weaker or spread over different bodies. Therefore, the powers 
of regulators need to be further reinforced and harmonised.
Pursuing the internal market requires not only an enhanced co-operation 
of national regulators, but also European level regulatory action. Such 
work has been co-ordinated within the ERGEG framework, where the 
Commission could seek advice of energy regulators on policy issues. It has 
also served as a platform for discussion on and implementation of different 
initiatives. Whereas ERGEG proved itself as a  credible driver of market 
convergence, it has lacked the formal powers to establish common binding 
standards to facilitate cross-border trade and, through that, the realisation of 
the internal energy market. The Commission therefore decided to propose 
the establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER). It is supposed to close the existing regulatory gap and be empowered 
to adopt individual and legally binding decisions concerning the cross-border 
sections of transport infrastructure. On top of that it would also exercise 
regulatory oversight of the co-operation between TSOs.
62 Where do we go?This TSO co-operation, currently of a voluntary nature, is also proposed to 
be formalised as a European Network of TSOs (ENTSO). It is expected to 
facilitate the development of detailed market and technical codes that are 
needed for the smooth and reliable operation of the interconnected energy 
networks. This also includes the enhancement of the efficient transfer of 
operational information and a co-ordinated effort to increase transparency on 
the usage of the transport infrastructure. ENTSO would also play an important 
role in the harmonised planning of the European network infrastructure by 
issuing forward looking network development plans.
Since transparency is one of the crucial prerequisites for the development 
of competitive energy markets, proposals brought forward within the 
3
rd package will also have to address key aspects of it. Particular importance 
has to be attached to the release of fundamental data which are indispensable 
for optimal dispatch and trading decisions and to understand the drivers of 
supply and demand. Today, such data are often only available for incumbents 
with generation and/or transmission assets who either do not release them at 
all or only do it in a time frame, format or aggregation they find appropriate. 
Although this situation, thanks to the regional implementation of relevant 
guidelines, has recently improved significantly, further, sufficiently detailed, 
harmonised and legally binding rules will be necessary to achieve the desired 
level. This has to be than complemented with a  carefully defined set of 
transactional data to gain a more precise picture of the liquidity and evolution 
of traded wholesale markets.
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6. Conclusion
With increasing trading activity, marketplaces established themselves as 
indispensable platforms for the whole energy community. As such they 
became natural benchmarks on which market participants are increasingly 
base their commercial decisions. This also implies that prices formed on 
these markets are of crucial importance not only for participants executing 
transactions directly, but also for any subsequent dealings, including the 
supply of final customers.
Ever increasing electricity and gas prices put wholesale markets in the focus 
of the energy discussion. Successive inquiries revealed serious shortcomings, 
blaming concentrated, intransparent and poorly integrated markets for the 
situation. These findings gave the final impetus to ERGEG’s planned Regional 
Initiatives, seeking the implementation of workable frameworks for regional 
market integration. Whereas these initiatives delivered useful results, they are 
based on a voluntary approach of the stakeholders involved and cannot tackle 
any structural market barriers. To remedy this situation and to give a final boost 
to the process leading to an efficiently functioning internal energy market, the 
Commission put together a number of key legislative proposals, dubbed as the 
3
rd energy package. Its central elements are the ownership unbundling of the 
transmission networks and an enhanced regulatory framework including the 
establishment of an EU level regulatory agency.
The success of the internal energy market and that of the 3
rd package, which 
is supposed to pave the way for it, greatly depends on the courage of member 
states whose governments hold the key to this process. Their decision will 
ultimately set the framework for a market, the proper functioning of which 
is essential for the overall European economy, be it the industry, small 
businesses or household customers.NORGES BANK’S EXPERIENCES WITH THE ORGANISATION OF 
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1. Introduction
This paper discusses some of the most important features of the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund – Global. Focus will be on the underlying 
economics of the Fund, and on how the management model is structured.
672.  Importance of petroleum for the Norwegian economy
Over the last 35 years Norway has become one of the largest oil and gas 
exporters in the World. Petroleum counts today for 25% of total production 
in Norway, close to 40 per cent of state revenues, and more than half of the 
total Norwegian export.
Figure 1 shows the petroleum production profile in Norway. So far oil has 
been most important. However, oil production has already started to decline 
while gas production is expected to continue to increase over the next years. 
We see from the figure that Norway is now close to the top of the petroleum 
production profile.
The combination of high petroleum production and high oil prices has led to 
strong growth of the Fund, see figure 2. The first allocation to the Fund came 
in 1996. At the end of 2007, the Fund had risen to USD 400 billion. We expect 
the Fund to grow rapidly also in coming years. It is projected to reach USD 
800 billion in 2014.
Figure 1 The Norwegian petroleum production profile
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3.  Objectives of the fund
The Government Pension Fund has two main objectives: One is to serve as 
a  savings instrument with an aim to distribute petroleum revenues across 
generations. The petroleum resources are part of our national wealth and 
belong not only to the current generation but also to future generations. 
The second objective is to shield the domestic economy from fluctuations in 
oil prices. Even though Norway has a fairly diversified tax-base, the large 
variability in the price of oil would have caused large demand fluctuations 
in the Norwegian economy, if petroleum revenues were to be used as they 
accrue. This could have a  negative impact on the competitiveness of our 
internationally exposed industries.  Thus, the Fund serves as a buffer between 
current petroleum revenues and the spending of these revenues in the 
Norwegian economy.
The alternative to setting up the Fund would have been to regulate the 
extraction path of oil and gas by putting a conservative upper limit on annual 
extraction. This is, to some extent, what we did in the 1970s and 1980s. By 
setting up the Fund, we have separated the extraction of oil and gas from 
the actual spending of the petroleum revenues. This has resulted in higher 
production of oil and gas over the last decade.
In 2006 the name was changed from Government Petroleum Fund to 
Government Pension Fund – Global. However, it is important to stress that 
the Fund is not ear-marked for future pension expenditure. The return of 
the fund should continue to be a general support to the Government budget. 
Pension expenditures will be a significant part of this budget in future due to 
demographic changes in Norway over the next decades.71
4.  How the fund works
The entire government petroleum revenues, as well as the return on the Fund, 
go into the Government Pension Fund – Global. Then, an amount equal to the 
non-oil budget deficit is transferred into the fiscal budget. This mechanism 
ensures three objectives: First, the variability in petroleum revenues is 
isolated to the growth rate of the Fund. Second, any use of the Fund is 
integrated into the ordinary budget routine and does not undermine the fiscal 
budget as a single instrument for assigning priority to different needs. And 
third, the amount of spending of petroleum revenues, that is the size of the 
non-oil budget deficit, can be aligned with the needs of fiscal policy as well 
as with the targeted intergenerational distribution.
Note that this setup for the Fund can work with different fiscal rules or 
guidelines for how large the non-oil budget deficit should be. In Norway, the 
parliament approved in 2001 a fiscal guideline that implies that the annual 
non-oil deficit should, on average over the business cycle, be limited to 
4 per cent of the Fund. This is assumed to be the long-term expected real 
return on the Fund. Such a guideline provides predictability in the level of 
spending. Three successive governments have been loyal to this guideline 
and it still enjoys a substantial majority backing in the Norwegian parliament. 
Adherence to this policy is also scrutinized closely by the public who have 
developed a sense of ownership of the Fund.
There are two stabilizing mechanisms in this fiscal guideline. The first is in 
case of large changes in the value of the fund. The second is related to the 
economic cycle. So, for instance, if there is a sharp drop in the value of the 
fund or if there is a recession in the economy, the government could spend 
more than 4%. This mechanism is of course symmetrical. In 2007, a year 
where the Norwegian economy was booming, the use of petroleum revenues 
was less than 4 per cent of the Fund.72
5.  Division of responsibility
One key element of the Fund Management Model is accountability. The Fund 
is formally owned by the Ministry of Finance, while operational management 
is delegated to Norges Bank. Thus, there is a clear division of responsibilities 
between the Ministry and the Bank. This arrangement is formalised through 
a management mandate given to the Bank by the Ministry.
•   The Ministry of Finance has the responsibility for the key long term 
strategic decisions affecting expected return and risk. The Ministry 
determines a benchmark portfolio and establishes risk limits and guidelines. 
This means that most of the variation in the return of the Fund is determined 
by decisions made by the Ministry.
•   The Bank’s main responsibility is to maximise expected return relative 
to the benchmark – within risk limits formulated in the mandate. Hence, 
Norges Bank has a mandate to engage in active portfolio management in 
addition to providing a cost-effective conversion of incoming petroleum 
wealth into financial assets. Since 1997, the Fund has averaged a real return 
of 4.3 per cent, of which the bank has delivered 0.40 per cent from active 
management.
The Ministry submits an annual White Paper to the Norwegian parliament 
where the management of the Fund is reviewed. Important strategic decisions 
are also presented to the Norwegian parliament before decisions are 
implemented. A recent example is the decision to increase the share allocated 
to equities from 40 per cent to 60 per cent.
Another key feature of the Fund’s management model is transparency and 
disclosure of information. This is emphasized as a key tool in building trust, 
both domestically and internationally. All investment principles and guidelines 
as well as strategic advice and second opinion reports are made public. Norges 
Bank publishes quarterly reports and holds press conferences. The annual 
reports disclose a list of every single investment held at the end of the year and 
the key elements of how we perform in our corporate governance work.
The combination of accountability and transparency has contributed to a high 
level of confidence in how Norway’s national financial savings are managed. 
Confidence is vital in maintaining motivation among Norwegians for saving 
our wealth rather than limiting our oil production or immediately spending 
the petroleum revenues.73
6. Investment  strategy
The Fund’s aim is to maximize the international purchasing power of 
the fund in the long run. The investment strategy seeks to achieve a high 
financial return with moderate risk. High return entails that the fund invest 
in equity, see figure 3. Moderate risk entails that the fund is well diversified 
across countries and asset classes. The benchmark portfolio consists of 
approx 18000 different equities and bonds from a large number of countries. 
Moreover, the Fund is a financial investor, with a diverse portfolio of non-
strategic holdings in a large range of companies. The maximum ownership 
stake in an individual company is limited to 10 per cent, while the average 
ownership stake is approximately 0.5 per cent. The Fund holds no large or 
“strategic” ownership stakes.
Figure 3 Investment strategy of the Government Pension Fund – Global
The Norwegian government has issued Ethical Guideline for the Pension 
Fund Global. It is based on three pillars. The first is exercise of ownership 
rights to reflect internationally accepted principles such as the UN Global 
Compact and the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. The second 
pillar is negative screening of companies that produce weapons that may 
violate fundamental humanitarian principles. The third pillar is exclusion of 
companies that are considered to be an unacceptable risk of contributing to 
serious violations of human rights or severe environmental damages. 7. Concluding  remarks
There are three main insights we have gained in the decade the Fund has 
existed.
Perhaps most importantly, the Government Pension Fund and the fiscal 
guideline have helped to avoid the common pitfalls in resource rich 
economies, e.g. lack of fiscal discipline and loss of focus in structural policy. 
The Fund has shielded the mainland economy from excessive variability and 
has to a large extent reduced the oil-price dependency of the exchange rate. 
Another important key to the success of the Fund so far has been the clear 
division of responsibility between the Ministry of Finance as the owner and 
Norges Bank as the manager. This entails that there is a separation between 
the economic policy role of the Fund and investment decisions made by 
professionals in a performance-oriented environment. 
Finally, an essential insight is the importance of political support for the 
strategic asset allocation. There was a broad consensus in parliament behind 
the choice of investing in equities in 1997. This was important in order to 
navigate through the turbulent waters of equity markets in the beginning of 
this century – and such turbulence will certainly return. 
The model we have chosen in Norway has evolved in a Norwegian setting and 
is not necessarily suited as a blueprint for other countries. But I believe it is 
important to understand the basic, and maybe universal, principles underlying 
the model and adapt them to the particular fiscal situation and the particular 
political tradition of the country in question. 
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1. Introduction
Russia’s recent economic performance has been impressive: during the 
past five years, the Russian economy grew by more than 40% in real 
terms. Initially, the recovery was triggered by the ruble devaluation in the 
aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis and its positive impact on the country’s 
competitiveness. In parallel, it was increasingly driven by the soaring world 
prices of oil and natural gas, which account for over one-half of total exports 
and are thus the country’s two main export commodities (see e.g. OECD, 
2004). This high share indicates that the Russian economy is vulnerable to 
energy price volatility, which poses a challenge to fiscal management given 
the future revenue uncertainty.
Revenue uncertainty affects all countries that show a  high degree of 
dependence on the exports of one particular commodity whose price is 
subject to sharp and unpredictable fluctuations. In many instances (including 
1 This paper is based on the author’s presentation at the SUERF Workshop on 3 March 2008 
and represents an update of an earlier study which was published in the Focus on European 
Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Nr. 1, 2007.
77the situation in Russia since 2004), the fiscal policy response has been to 
accumulate extra-budgetary funds (often explicitly referred to as stabilization 
funds) in times of favorable external developments, with the aim of tapping 
these funds in case the external conditions deteriorate. In fact, in setting up 
an oil fund, Russia followed the example of 16 other countries, including 
Norway, a number of Middle East, African and Latin American countries, but 
also Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The U.S. state Alaska operates two oil funds 
(one each for saving and stabilization purposes),
2 while Chile has established 
a copper stabilization fund.
The previous experience with stabilization funds has been mixed 
(see e. g. Bartsch, 2006; Kalyuzhnova, 2006; Vatansever, 2005; Davis et al., 
2001; Fasano, 2000). In Kuwait, Norway and Alaska, for example, the funds 
have indeed been effective tools of asset-building aimed at counteracting 
a future projected decline in oil revenues or a projected increase in social 
outlays (as in Norway). However, in some other countries, e.g. Oman, Nigeria 
and Venezuela, the experience with oil funds has been less positive – arguably 
because of frequent changes to the fund rules and deviations from its intended 
purposes. Thus, Venezuela serves as an ironic example of a case in which the 
whole concept was perverted, as the moneys transferred to the stabilization 
fund over the 1990s were financed with growing government borrowing. 
Generally, commitment to fiscal discipline and sound macroeconomic 
management has been crucial in the successful creation of funds.
This paper deals with the institutional setup and the performance of the 
Russian Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in 2004–2007, and analyzes the 
available policy options for the two newly established funds – the Reserve 
Fund and the National Welfare Fund – which replaced the OSF in February 
2008 in the wake of a comprehensive budgetary reform. Section 2 outlines the 
OSF’s rules, while sections 3 and 4 analyze the OSF’s performance as a tool 
of macroeconomic stabilization and monetary sterilization, respectively. 
Section 5 deals with the recent OSF reform and outlines future scenarios.
2  The stabilization and saving functions are to be distinguished. In line with theory, 
stabilization is one of the three essential functions assigned to the state (stabilization, allocation 
and distribution) and consists of smoothing the path of economic growth in the short and medium 
run by means of countercyclical policy. While the task of stabilization is generally faced by a wide 
range of countries (which are not necessarily commodity exporters), the need for stabilization 
in commodity exporting countries typically results from commodity price volatility. In turn, the 
saving function applies in the long run and is confined only to countries whose natural resources 
are potentially depletable. In this case, after the country’s available resources have run out, the 
accumulated savings are intended to maintain the living standards of future generations.
78 Introduction2.  Features of the OSF
The OSF was established in January 2004
3 with the purpose of (1) 
reducing the vulnerability of the state budget to the volatility of world oil 
prices (stabilization function), and (2) sterilizing the impact of oil-related 
foreign exchange inflows on the money supply and inflation (sterilization 
function). By the end of 2007, the OSF had built up assets worth more than 
RUB 3.8 trillion (no splitting into the next line if possible).
The OSF accumulated money as long as the world price for Russia’s Urals 
oil exceeded the cutoff price (which was initially set at USD 20 per barrel, 
but was revised to USD 27 starting from January 2006). The OSF could be 
tapped for covering federal budget deficits when the Urals price fell below 
the cutoff price.
The OSF collected revenues from two taxes, (1) a portion of the export duty 
on crude oil, and (2) a portion of the mineral resources extraction tax on oil. 
Both referred only to that part of the tax that stemmed from the world price 
in excess of the cutoff price. Taxes on oil products and natural gas were not 
transferred to the OSF, even though their prices closely followed crude oil 
prices.
 4
In addition, parts of the federal budget surpluses (which were attained even 
though the additional tax revenues from high oil prices were absorbed by 
the OSF rather than by the current budget) were transferred to the OSF as 
well. The federal budget surpluses stood at 4.2% of GDP in 2004, 7.5% in 
2005 and 7.4% in 2006. The surpluses were partly attributable to deliberate 
targeting, but they were also helped by the conservative oil price assumptions 
underlying the budgets.
The OSF was managed by the Ministry of Finance and until mid-2006 was 
held entirely in Russian ruble that were deposited interest-free at the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR).
5 However, in summer 2006, a strategic decision was 
3 The bulk of regulations covering the operation of the OSF are contained in Ministerstvo 
Finansov Rossiyskoi Federatsii (2006a, 2006b).
4 This has changed since February 2008 (see section 5 for details).
5 The main consideration behind keeping the entire OSF in Russian ruble were the perceived 
fears of the Russian assets ‘abroad’ being frozen as a  result of possible international legal 
disputes.
79taken on converting the OSF into foreign-currency denominated assets, and 
the conversion had been completed by the end of the year. This was in line 
with the Budget Code provision stipulating that the OSF can be invested in 
foreign sovereign debt securities. The government guideline was that these 
should be high-quality
6 sovereign bonds of 14 developed countries – the euro 
area countries, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Thus, the OSF was held in 
a currency basket with the following composition: 45% in U.S. dollars, 45% 
in euro and the remaining 10% in pound sterling. Technically, the government 
regulations provided for two theoretical options of the OSF’s placement: 
Its funds could be used to directly purchase foreign bonds, and/or could be 
deposited in foreign currency-denominated accounts at the CBR, with the 
returns on these accounts being based on the performance of the underlying 
foreign debt securities. However, in reality only the second option was used.
6 With a AAA/Aaa credit rating from at least two of the three rating agencies Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch IBCA.
80 Features of the OSF3. Sterilization  Function
Given the small size of the Russian banking and financial sector and its overall 
state of development, the CBR has only few instruments at its disposal to 
sterilize the oil-related (and, since 2006, also capital-related) foreign exchange 
inflows. Against this background, the role of the OSF as a  sterilization 
instrument has been crucial. As table 1 shows, the CBR’s foreign assets have 
been growing rapidly and now account for nearly all assets. Between January 
2004 and January 2008, the value of foreign assets grew nearly five times in 
nominal terms, which represents an increase by some RUB 9.5 trillion. This 
increase was sterilized only slightly (to the effect of some RUB 0.3 trillion) by 
a reduction in already modest domestic assets, notably in claims on government 
and banks. Still, only about one-  third of the increase in (net) foreign assets 
has actually translated into monetary expansion (i.e. monetary base growth), 
as the value of reserve money increased by only RUB 3.6 trillion over the 
same period. The reason is that another RUB 5.2 trillion was absorbed by an 
increase in government deposits, two-thirds of it representing the OSF and 
the rest accounted for by other deposits (including those of the regional and 
local governments). Thus, the sterilization function of the OSF arises from 
the fact that foreign exchange earned from oil exports largely stayed with the 
CBR, as it was held by the government in a CBR account. Alternatively, any 
use of OSF money for the purchase of domestic assets – whether physical or 
financial – would have increased the monetary base and could have led to 
inflationary and appreciation pressures.
Obviously, the CBR’s sterilization efforts were also supported by the early 
repayment of the external debt Russia owed – particularly the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club and Vneshekonombank (which serviced 
Russia’s sovereign external debt following the financial crisis in the period 
from 1998 to 1999) in summer 2005 and summer 2006 (see table 2).
7 On 
both occasions, the CBR’s foreign assets contracted temporarily, mirrored by 
a reduction of government deposits on the liability side of the CBR’s balance 
sheet.
In turn, the gradual conversion of the OSF from ruble into foreign currency, 
which took place in the second half of 2006, did not matter in macroeconomic 
terms. Also, it cannot be traced from the CBR’s balance sheet, at least at the 
7 Further early repayments of foreign debt, albeit on a much smaller scale, were undertaken 
in 2007.
 
81aggregation level presented in table 1. The conversion presumably resulted 
in a mere substitution of ruble-denominated government deposits by foreign 
currency-denominated government deposits on the liability side of the CBR’s 
balance sheet and a  corresponding replacement of foreign exchange with 
foreign debt securities within the item “foreign assets” on the asset side of 
the CBR’s balance sheet.
The sterilization policy by means of the OSF certainly contributed to 
macroeconomic stability – at least until recently. Despite the soaring oil 
prices, the Russian economy did not show signs of excess aggregate demand, 
despite buoyant private consumption and rather solid capital formation, while 
the recent pick-up in inflation (to 11.9% in 2007 on the end-year basis) is 
largely attributed to the soaring world food price and is essentially a global 
phenomenon.
Table 1: Balance Sheet of the Russian Monetary Authorities between 2004 and 2008
In RUB billion, as of 1 January 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Assets      
Foreign assets 2,391 3,610 5,555 8,087 11,887
Claims on government 477 426 276 247 354
Claims on credit organizations 198 178 28 43 50
Liabilities      
Reserve money 1,914 2,380 2,914 4,122 5,513
  incl. money outside banks 1,147 1,535 2,009 2,785 3,702
Term deposits and foreign 
currency deposits 31 36 44 59 446
Foreign liabilities 220 215 299 79 176
Government deposits 446 1,048 2,146 3,688 5,671
  incl. regional and local 
government 43 86 127 226 345
Capital accounts 298 188 210 84 102
Other (net) 159 350 248 347 386
Source: Central Bank of Russia
82 Sterilization Function4. Stabilization  Function
According to the government regulations, the OSF could be spent to cover the 
federal budget deficit when the oil price falls below the cutoff price. However, 
it could also be tapped for other purposes in case it had accumulated more 
than RUB 500 billion. Given the persistently high oil prices that hovered 
far above the cutoff price, the RUB 500 billion threshold had already been 
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Table 2: Dynamics of the Oil Stabilization Fund between 2004 and 2007
RUB billion 2004 2005 2006 2007
Inflows/revenues
Unspent federal budget surplus
from previous year 106 218 48 157
Oil revenues (export duty plus extraction tax) 416 1,175 1,641 1,587




Paris Club 430 605
Vneshekonombank 124
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 12
Portugal 2
United States 9
United Arab Emirates 11
Pension Fund 30
Investment Fund & equity stakes
in ‘state corporations’ 300
Net inflows 522 716 1,107 1,562
Balances, end of year* 522 1,238 2,347 3,849
*Note: Balances in a given year may deviate from the sum of balances in previous year and net inflows 
due to changes in valuation.
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations.surpassed by the end of 2004. As a result, the OSF funds were subsequently 
used to repay the country’s foreign debt, to cover the public pension fund 
deficit, and – more recently – to finance the newly established Investment 
Fund and the equity stakes in the so-called ‘state corporations’, notably the 
one dealing with nanotechnologies (see table 2).
The nearly RUB 1.3 trillion worth of early settlement of public foreign debt, 
largely ahead of schedule, enabled the country to economize on interest 
payments and represented a net financial benefit to the state – even after 
allowing for the penalties charged to Russia for the premature contract 
withdrawal. Since the payments were financed from OSF funds, they had no 
macroeconomic impact within the country. Similarly, the RUB 300 billion 
worth allocation to the Investment Fund and the ‘state corporations’ in late 
2007 has not had any sizeable impact so far, given that the decision on the 
final use of these moneys is still pending. The modest RUB 30 billion worth 
of allocations to the pension fund in 2005 had a similarly small, or virtually 
no impact at all.
 
Despite these expenditures, the OSF totaled USD 156 billion (corresponding 
to RUB 3.85 trillion) on January 1, 2008. The OSF’s pivotal role as a tool 
of economic stabilization can be seen from the following estimations 
(Gurvich,  2006). In the period from 2004 to 2005, some 75% of the 
additional fiscal revenue from the high oil prices were saved (primarily in the 
OSF), amounting to some 60% of total additional income to the economy. 
Accordingly, the Russian federal budget would have shown only a minor 
deficit even if the oil price had fallen back to USD 20 per barrel. The recent 
economic performance suggests that the OSF, by building up reserves rather 
than spending extra revenues, has also helped decouple GDP growth from 
the oil price dynamics. Despite the soaring oil price since 2004, the country’s 
economic growth has been fairly stable at 6% to 8%.
84 Stabilization Function5.  Recent reforms and policy challenges
By the end of 2007, the size of the OSF was nearly eight times the value of the 
RUB 500 billion threshold, above which the funds could be used for purposes 
other than budget deficit financing. Besides, the pressure to spend the OSF 
was all the more intense as most short- and medium-term oil price forecasts 
assumed values above USD 50 per barrel, and it seemed extremely unlikely 
that the price would fall below USD 27 (the cutoff price set for the OSF). This 
implied that stabilization in the sense in which it was meant at the time when 
the OSF was set up, i.e. as a buffer for federal fiscal balances, was unlikely 
to be required anytime soon.
Thus, the mounting OSF reserves were one of the major reasons behind 
the recent decision by the Russian government to implement a  profound 
budgetary reform, the details of which are presented in the box below. Most 
notably, as of February 2008, the OSF was divided into the so-called ‘Reserve 
Fund’ (with essentially the same function and the same allocation strategy as 
the previously existing OSF) and the ‘National Welfare Fund’ (NWF), which 
is supposed to save the oil-related wealth for the future generations (based 
on the idea of intergenerational equity) and may be invested into riskier but 
potentially more profitable assets.
8
Essentially, the present dilemma for the Russian authorities is to decide 
whether the NWF should be increasingly spent or saved. In case the 
government opts for saving, one possibility would be to invest into foreign 
equities.
9 This would be in line with Norway’s experience and might have 
the advantage of higher returns in the long run as compared to foreign 
sovereign bonds (as demonstrated by past performance). Besides, in terms of 
risk diversification, investing in foreign (rather than domestic) assets seems 
justified, since securities issued by countries which would benefit from 
falling oil prices – e.g., the United States or the EU – provide, to some extent, 
a hedge against excessive reliance on the oil revenues. However, in terms 
of profitability, such a decision appears rather ambiguous. In particular, it is 
questionable whether the return on foreign equities will match the combined 
8 The final decision on the allocation strategy for the newly created National Welfare Fund is 
still pending.
9 Initially, this proposal was put forward by the Russian first deputy prime minister Alexander 
Zhukov (according to his announcement of May 2006, Russia could invest up to 10% of the 
OSF in equity - see Pryde, (2007)) and re-confirmed later by the finance minister Alexei Kudrin 
(International Monetary Fund, (2007)).
85effects of the Russian ruble’s (likely) nominal appreciation and of the return 
on ruble-denominated assets.
Box: Features of the Russian federal budgetary reform, as of 2008
•  three-year budget planning (now for 2008–2010);
•  division into ‘oil’ and ‘non-oil’ budget;
•  ‘oil budget‘ now also collects revenues from oil products and natural gas 
– unlike the OSF, which collected revenues only from oil;
•  OSF (‘oil budget’) divided as of February 2008 into two funds: ‘Reserve 
Fund’ (RUB 3.1 trillion) and ‘National Welfare Fund’ (RUB 0.8 trillion);
•  Reserve Fund serves the purpose of fiscal stabilization (in line with the 
original OSF goal), is maintained at 10% of GDP and invested in highly 
liquid and low-yielding foreign securities;
•  annual transfers from Reserve Fund to ‚non-oil‘ budget (in 2008 envisaged 
at some 6% of GDP);
•  ‘non-oil’ budget deficit capped at 4.7% of GDP, and the maximum transfer 
from the Reserve Fund to the ‘non-oil’ budget at 3.7% of GDP – both 
effective starting from 2011 (in 2008-2010, ‘oil transfer’ is expected to be 
significantly higher at up to 6.1% of GDP in 2008);
10
•  National Welfare Fund
 preserves
 the oil-generated wealth in the long term
 
– for the benefit of future generations.
The Norwegian model as it stands would also imply the so-called ‘bird-in-hand’ 
rule (implemented since 2001), whereby only newly accrued interest on fund 
assets is spent. However, there is good reason to believe that the Russian 
model should be less conservative than the Norwegian one. Given that 
the Russian economy is likely to grow much faster than the Norwegian 
one (in line with the hypothesis of beta convergence), concerns about 
intergenerational solidarity appear to be less relevant in the case of Russia, 
as future generations will presumably be much wealthier than the present 
generation of Russians (OECD, 2006).
Alternatively, the government could decide to spend at least part of the NWF 
money now, or else spend (part of) the future inflows into the NWF on a current 
basis. That would be a radical change to the previous strategy: the RUB 300 
billion worth allocation to the Investment Fund and the ‘state corporations’ 
and the minor allocation to the pension fund apart, no major commitments 
to spend/invest the Fund moneys within Russia have been made so far. 
Two main arguments have been typically raised by Russian liberal-minded 
10 See Deutsche Bank, (2007).
86 Recent reforms and policy challengeseconomic policymakers
11 against spending the Fund money already now or 
on a current basis. They maintained that (1) given the extensive corruption at 
all government levels, any spending within Russia would be inefficient, and 
that (2) any domestic spending would be inflationary.
At the same time, earlier estimates by the IMF (which usually advocates 
a cautious approach in fiscal issues) suggested that the volumes of federal 
government spending in Russia were not only far below levels that would 
be unsustainable in the long run, but were in fact suboptimal (IMF, 2006). In 
particular, according to the IMF findings, primary budget expenditures would 
have to be raised by some 5 percentage points of GDP in the medium term in 
order for the government to reach the so-called ‘permanent consumption’ rule, 
which maximizes consumption (expressed as a constant share of expenditures 
to GDP) over time.
The case for spending more becomes even stronger if we allow for the 
possibility that the money is not just used for consumption, but also invested. 
Such investment could, for instance, be directed to upgrading the country’s 
infrastructure, thus encouraging private investment in the nonenergy branches 
of economy. In this way, if the government decided to use the NWF money 
domestically, it would contribute substantially to the diversification of the 
Russian economy, which is certainly one of its goals. This diversification 
would, in turn, contribute e.g. to the stability of public finances. Besides, 
any resulting productivity improvements in the nonenergy tradable sector 
would counteract the possible Dutch disease effects stemming from higher 
inflationary pressure and an additional ruble appreciation potentially associated 
with spending part of the NWF reserves.
12
The government could also target e.g. education, health and ecological cleanup 
activities with these investments. Although the value of such investment 
might be difficult to quantify in economic terms, it is fairly obvious that it 
would raise the living standard of the population. In addition, it could also 
lay the foundation for long-term sustainable economic growth, e.g. thanks to 
human capital accumulation.
Provided that the (net) benefits are positive, additional spending could be 
advocated even if institutional weaknesses limit the effectiveness of public 
11 Including the finance minister Alexei Kudrin and the former presidential economic adviser 
Andrei Illarionov.
12 See also Barisitz and Ollus (2007), who argue that, in the recent past, curtailment of domestic 
demand through the OSF has doubtlessly contributed to countering Dutch disease pressures.
87 Recent reforms and policy challengesexpenditures. One might also argue that some additional spending, e.g. in 
the area of public sector wages, in combination with other measures, could 
even reduce the incentives for corruption in these areas, which in many cases 
reflect peoples’ efforts to make ends meet.
Any sizeable domestic spending of the NWF money would pose a serious 
challenge to the country’s macroeconomic management. In particular, 
it is essential that any major withdrawal of government foreign 
currency-denominated deposits at the CBR and their subsequent conversion 
into ruble be accompanied by corresponding policy coordination with the 
CBR.
13 The aim of such an approach would be both to avoid unwelcome 
appreciation pressure (and the likely speculation on such appreciation) and 
to leave open the possibility for counteracting any unwarranted depreciation 
pressure in the future. At the same time, the appreciation pressure (and 
the inflationary pressure alike) is likely to be kept within limits as long as 
additional government spending is import intensive, e.g. made within the 
framework of infrastructure development programs involving large-scale 
imports of investment goods.
13 For instance, the ministries of finance in the Czech Republic and Poland had explicit 
agreements with the respective central banks on depositing privatization-related one-off foreign 
currency inflows in a special account and on converting funds from these accounts into national 
currency directly with the central bank, i.e. off market.
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It is evident that the Russian economy is largely based on the energy sector. 
This fact has raised concern in academic circles as to whether Russia is 
to some degree affected by the Dutch disease, i.e. whether a sharp rise of 
commodity prices might result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
which would undermine the competitiveness of manufacturing and may 
lead to the deindustrialization of the economy. We focus on this possible 
final outcome, which has not been studied much in the literature so far: We 
compare Russian industrial import growth (based on EU-25 export volume 
figures to Russia) with domestic industrial production growth (disaggregated 
by branches) in the period from 2002 to 2006. In all manufacturing sectors 
except electrical, electronic and optical equipment and strongly protected 
foodstuffs, Russian imports are found to be expanding faster than domestic 
1 Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Foreign Research Division
2 Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
3 This study was jointly written during Simon-Erik Ollus’ research visit at the OeNB in 
September and October 2006. The study was published earlier in BOFIT Online 2007 No. 2 and in 
OeNB Focus on European Economic Integration 1/2007. All the opinions expressed in this paper 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of BOFIT or the OeNB.
93output. In some sectors, imports have even exceeded domestic production. 
Import competition is therefore strong and rising. We conclude that Russia 
may be facing incipient deindustrialization at least in some parts of the 
manufacturing sector. This could indicate that the Russian economy has 
contracted the Dutch disease, although it should be noted that other factors 
could also have driven sectoral changes. While it is beyond the scope of our 
study to examine whether the other chain links of the Dutch disease hold 
as well, it does provide evidence of some movements in the direction of 
deindustrialization, which is in line with the Dutch disease theory.
941. Introduction
Oil prices have witnessed a very strong rise and attained high levels in recent 
years. This development has renewed interest in the Dutch disease hypothesis 
and in exploring its validity for oil exporting countries like Russia. The core 
model of the Dutch disease hypothesis follows Corden and Neary (1982) 
and Corden (1984). It assumes that the economy consists of three sectors: 
Natural resources or resource tradable goods (simply referred to as “oil” in 
this contribution), non-resource tradable goods (“manufactured goods”) and 
nontradable goods (“services”).
4 Windfall revenues resulting from an increase 
in oil prices have the initial effect of raising the aggregate incomes of factors 
4 Of course, these are not the only plausible references. For instance, in some countries/
territories (Iceland, Greenland), fishing is the natural resource-based industry. Or, alternatively, 
in some Asian and African economies it is agriculture that can be squeezed by an increase in 
energy exports (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Bardt, 2005). Or, in particular circumstances, inflows 
of large amounts of foreign financial assistance might trigger deindustrialization (ICEG European 
Center, 2006). Furthermore, the above identifications, e.g. of nontradable goods as “services,” 
are admittedly not precise and somewhat outdated, as in the early 21
st century some services 
are actually more tradable than manufacturing goods as they can be delivered via the Internet at 
virtually no cost – and under high competition. We continue to use the above terms, however, 
because they still seem to be largely correct and because they provide readers with concrete 
references that mean something to them.
Chart 1: Rouble Real Effective Exchange Rate and Oil Price 1995-2006
Source: MinEcon and Bloomberg
95 Introductionemployed in the oil sector. According to the model, this may give rise to 
a resource movement effect and to a spending effect.
The resource movement effect is brought about by a rise of wages in the 
oil sector, which induces a  movement of labor out of manufacturing and 
nontradables (direct deindustrialization). The spending effect involves higher 
oil sector revenues which raise aggregate demand, thus pushing up the 
price of services and fanning inflation, which implies an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. Upward wage pressure throughout the economy erodes 
manufacturing competitiveness and forces a downsizing of the non-resource 
tradable sector (indirect deindustrialization). Moreover, the crowding-out of 
manufacturing sets the stage for “unbalanced growth” which may be highly 
exposed to resource (oil) price and supply volatility and may therefore result 
in macroeconomic instability, stop-and-go investment activity, boom-bust 
cycles and overall sluggish long-term growth (Égert and Leonard, (2006)). 
Once manufacturing is forfeited, growth tends to slow down because positive 
externalities from manufacturing in the form of faster technological progress 
are lost and production shifts away from activities that facilitate learning by 
doing (Kronenberg, (2004)).
So far, there has not been much research on Russia and the Dutch disease. The 
reasons seem to be the short observation period for this transition country, 
difficult access to reliable data, frequent revisions of time series, and the fact 
that the most recent oil boom that could serve as a basis for measuring possible 
Dutch disease effects only started in 1999/2000. However, notwithstanding 
intermittent drops, this oil boom has continued until at least the fall of 2006, 
which is unusually long in the light of the experience related to oil cycles in 
the past decades. Moreover, Russia is one of the world’s primary producers of 
oil and gas. The share of oil and gas industries in Russia’s total GDP comes 
to about one-fourth and the share of these two industries in the country’s total 
export revenues has reached nearly two-thirds.
Most studies so far have found that while Russia exhibits some of the 
symptoms of the disease, it has not (yet) caught the full-fledged malady. 
Åslund (2005) stresses the fact that average wages have risen by over 30% 
annually in U.S. dollar terms from 1999 to 2005. His assessment concludes 
that many manufacturing branches cannot develop too favorably with such 
a leap in labor costs. Latsis (2005) goes one step further, maintaining that 
Russia’s currency is appreciating because of the huge inflows of export 
proceeds. In his view, the booming oil sector is strangling the country’s 
96 Introductionmanufacturing industries and he therefore concludes that “the Dutch disease 
is already here.”
In contrast, in a study measuring U.S. dollar wages and comparing production 
growth, export shares and import penetration, Westin (2005) finds no 
compelling sign of a decline in manufacturing. From a trade perspective, the 
growth of Russian exports of consumer-related and high-tech commodities 
worldwide and to the EU has not generally suffered in the period from 
1997 to 2001. However, the Russian market shares in exports of these 
product categories to the EU have slightly declined during this time. Import 
penetration ratios are calculated for a very small group of eleven products 
(mostly belonging to machinery and equipment) where, according to Westin, 
production statistics reliably tally with customs statistics. Regarding this very 
narrow sample, import penetration has progressed at a slower pace than the 
economy as a whole in the period from 1997 to 2003.
Roland (2005) likewise finds it premature to speak of Dutch disease in Russia. 
The ruble has no doubt been appreciating in real terms, but this does not seem 
to have compromised manufactured goods’ competitiveness. Between 2002 
and 2004, the increase of Russian exports of iron, steel and manufactures 
outstripped that of fuels and mining. According to Ahrend (2005), real ruble 
appreciation in the period from 1999 to 2004 was matched by stepped-up 
industrial restructuring efforts that led to significant labor productivity 
adjustments in the large majority of non-resource tradable sectors. Much of 
the improved competitiveness has been attained by “passive restructuring” 
(labor shedding etc.). Real ruble appreciation as well as some other Dutch 
disease symptoms (e.g. the value added of some nontradables, namely trade 
and agriculture, growing faster than industry) are confirmed for the period 
from 1999 to 2004 by Égert (2005).
Based on sectoral and time series analyses covering the period from 1997 to 
2004, Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) agree that high oil price-related windfall 
revenues in Russia have set the real exchange rate on an appreciation path that 
threatens the manufacturing sector’s competitiveness. However, the resource 
movement effect is unlikely to play a significant role in Russia, given that the 
oil sector employs relatively few workers and that labor mobility is generally 
low. The spending effect seems to be more important. Consistent with the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, appreciation has been largely proportional 
to productivity differential growth. Oomes and Kalcheva conclude that what 
likely helped stall the Dutch disease thus far are Russia’s prudent policies 
97 Introductionof saving its oil windfall revenues in the Stabilization Fund and swiftly 
redeeming its foreign debt.
Analyzing data up to 2005 and comparing manufacturing sector growth with 
that of energy extraction and with total GDP growth, Beck, Kamps and Mileva 
(2007) only find mixed evidence on manufacturing sector decline in Russia. 
Moreover, they find that evidence on labor shifting from manufacturing to 
services and mining is not conclusive.
While according to most studies, the Dutch disease does not appear imminent 
in Russia – or more precisely, did not appear imminent at the time of writing 
– they do seem to maintain that the long-term threat of an outbreak remains 
real. There are unambiguous signs of a real appreciation of the ruble and that 
this real appreciation is at least partly triggered by oil price rises and foreign 
currency inflows (see also Chart 1). But the majority of studies do not (yet) 
see any clear adverse effects on Russian manufacturing.
In this light we propose to add a specific contribution to the research and 
discussion of (the possible existence of) the Dutch disease in Russia. However, 
we will not attempt to verify the functioning of all (hypothetical) chain links 
of the Dutch disease. Our focus will be exclusively on the final stage, i.e. 
on whether some degree of deindustrialization or a loss of manufacturing 
competitiveness has happened or is happening. We are aware that a loss of 
industrial competitiveness itself does not necessarily have to be triggered by 
the Dutch disease. Hence, any conclusions with respect to the existence or 
nonexistence of the Dutch disease need not be absolutely compelling in our 
case.
Looking at the last link of the Dutch disease, we will focus on external 
competitiveness. A decrease in exports can be triggered by real appreciation, 
which may, in turn, be attributable to nominal appreciation or to unit labor cost 
increases. This point should be taken up in future research. Imports can also 
provide valuable information on the competitiveness of domestic industries, 
which may be crowded out by imports given the effects of real appreciation, 
which is triggered either by nominal appreciation or by labor cost increases. 
In this study, we will concentrate on import competition, which in fact has not 
yet been analyzed in depth in the empirical literature on Russia. Does import 
growth outstrip domestic production growth in the non-fuel sector? And if it 
does, which size have imports attained compared with domestic output? We 
98 Introductionwill analyze these questions on a branch-by-branch basis for the entire range 
of goods.
5
While this approach is promising, some qualifications must be noted with 
regard to import penetration being a useful indicator of the competitiveness of 
domestic industry. High import content in final domestic goods could mitigate 
this fact, especially if intermediate goods are classified differently than final 
goods. Higher imports do not necessarily compete with domestic goods if 
domestic goods are of low quality and imports are luxury goods. Furthermore, 
imports could have a positive impact on Russia’s productive capacity and 
thus stimulate investment, exports and growth in the longer term. Finally, 
although we exclude exports from our comparison, the case is still strong 
as about four-fifths of Russia’s exports are clearly natural resources, and 
manufactured goods account for only a tiny share of exports. Russia’s market 
share in mature Western market economies’ imports of manufactured goods is 
tiny. In the EU-25 market, for example, Russia’s share of manufactured goods 
imports only comes to a few percentage points of total imports. Therefore, 
speaking of Russian export competition in this context would not be very 
meaningful.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to 
statistical issues and highlights the logic behind, and limitations to, our 
approach. Section 3 investigates whether Russia shows symptoms of the 
Dutch disease, based on the import competition approach. Section 4 draws 
overall conclusions.
5 We focus on manufacturing and do not include competitive market-oriented services (see 
footnote 1) given the lack of comparable data in the latter field.
99 Introduction2. Statistical  Limitations
Instead of concentrating on import penetration like Westin (2005), we focus 
on growth rates in our approach. If imports in non-fuel sectors are found to 
have reached a substantial size and grow faster than domestic production, 
Russia would face some degree of the Dutch disease – otherwise not. Before 
proceeding to a detailed analysis of relevant data, some statistical limitations 
need to be discussed.
6 
The first problem we have to tackle is the lack of proper volume-based indices 
for Russian imports (and exports). The import figures reported by the Federal 
Customs Service of the Russian Federation are only available in nominal 
terms for international trade of goods classifications (Harmonized System
7, 
two-digit level), while for 95 specific commodities only detailed volume 
figures are available, but no data aggregated by subgroups in any Harmonized 
System (HS) classification. Hence, we lack coherent official data on Russian 
foreign trade volumes.
The second problem related to trade figures is that the Federal Customs 
Service’s figures tend to undervalue Russian foreign trade, and especially 
imports. This is true particularly in categories with high value-added 
commodities, textiles and footwear. For EU-25 exports to Russia, for 
example, the recorded value of 2005 exports was on average nearly 40% 
higher than the corresponding figure the Federal Customs Service reported 
for imports. Such discrepancies are partly connected to different ways of 
recording re-exports in trade with Russia. Moreover, personal imports and 
shadow economy activities are another reason for the gaps between partner 
countries’ registered exports to Russia and Russia’s registered imports. The 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) includes a special estimate 
of this deviation factor in its balance of payments figures. It came to 22% of 
total imports in 2005.
6 For more details see Ollus and Barisitz, (2007).
7 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, better known as the 
Harmonized System (HS) is a nomenclature developed by the World Customs Organization and 
covering two-digit to ten-digit levels. The EU’s Combined Nomenclature (CN) classification 
corresponds to the HS up to the six-digit level. The Federal Customs Service’s “Tovarnaya 
nomenklatura vneshne-ekonomicheskoy deyatelnosti” (TN VED) methodology also corresponds 
to the HS up to the six-digit level.
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It is normal, however, that partner countries’ trade statistics deviate to some 
degree, as there usually are differences in methodologies, exchange rates and 
accounting periods. Some countries also use secret categories for strategic 
goods, which makes comparisons more difficult. Figures reported by the 
Federal Customs Service differ from partner countries’ statistics particularly 
for value-added goods, which are also important in our comparison of import 
competition. Moreover, as there are no detailed data given in volume terms 
and import prices for whole categories, it is impossible to calculate detailed 
sector-wise import penetration figures based on Federal Customs Service 
statistics.
We thus need to find an alternative way to calculate Russia’s import 
development, namely on the basis of Russia’s main trading partners’ export 
statistics. In this paper we focus on Russian imports from the EU-25, as the 
relevant volume export data are available from Eurostat. According to the 
Federal Customs Service, the EU-25 have had a rather stable share of 44% 
in Russian imports over the past decade. A comparison of Eurostat data on 
exports to Russia with CBR import data also shows a quite stable average 
share of 48% for the same period. Hence, we use EU-25 exports as a proxy 
for developments in Russia’s total imports. Still, we are aware that the 
structure of imports from the EU-25 is not similar to that of imports e.g. from 
China or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). China’s exports 
to Russia record a  higher share of textiles and agricultural products with 
a lower value added than exports of the EU-25 and other OECD countries. 
However, we can probably assume that the structure of EU-25 exports closely 
corresponds to the export structure other OECD countries. According to the 
Federal Customs Service, the OECD countries account for 61% of Russia’s 
total imports. Acknowledging the limitations in trade statistics, we still use 
EU-25 data by Eurostat for lack of any better alternative.
8
We regrouped the Eurostat EU-25 data on exports to Russia from 12,061 
categories according to the Combined Nomenclature (CN) eight-digit level 
to correspond to the international prodcom
9 industrial output structure 
8 Other OECD countries, like the U.S.A., Japan and South Korea, also publish volume-based 
export data, so it would possible to widen the scope. As these countries’ data vary in terms of 
classification, however, combining them would be very time-consuming. Moreover, their trade 
pattern with Russia correlates strongly with that of the EU-25. China and the other CIS countries 
do not publish detailed data on volume exports.
9 Prodcom is a system for the collection and dissemination of statistics on the production 
of manufactured goods. The title comes from the French “PRODuction COMmunautaire” 
(Community Production) for mining, quarrying and manufacturing: sections B and C of the 
Statistical Classification of Economy Activity in the European Union (NACE 2). See http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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(C, DA-DM and E) that Russia has followed since the beginning of 2005. 
Finally, the data were indexed to 2005 prices.
An additional constraint to our approach is the lack of reliable long-term 
industrial production data. The methodological change introduced by the 
Russian statistical office, Rosstat, at the beginning of 2005 for the reporting 
of GDP and especially industrial production output statistics makes it hard 
to construct long-term time series on Russian industrial production by 
subsectors. We built a monthly time series backward from April 2006 to the 
beginning of 2002 and indexed it to 2005 sold production prices. Our analysis 
is thus limited by the data basis it relies on and by the rather short time span 
it covers. Still, given that the rise in oil prices as well as the real effective 
exchange rate appreciation of the Russian ruble started to gather momentum 
at the beginning of this decade and continued largely unabated at least until 
mid-2006, our time frame for investigating the existence of the Dutch disease 
in Russia appears to be appropriate.
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3.  Results: EU-25 Import Competition
In nearly all categories reviewed, imports grew much faster than domestic 
production. Between 2000 and 2005, total imports increased by over 20% per 
year (in volume terms), while exports augmented by no more than 9% and 
production by little over 6%. Russian import elasticity is currently above 3, 
which is much higher than in emerging markets on average. The imbalance 
in the growth of export and import volumes, however is not yet visible in 
Russian trade or current account figures (as measured in USD) as energy 
prices have kept rising over the whole period under review. If imports grow 
at such a quick pace, however, this gives reason for concern. And if oil prices 
stop increasing or even fall for a sustained period, the underlying trade deficit 
will become visible. In the following section we show the main results of our 
comparison of imports to Russia from the EU-25 with domestic production.
Chart 2 illustrates the structure of EU-25 exports to Russia between 2001 
and 2006. Russian imports from the EU-25 consist mainly of machinery 
and equipment (DK), electrical, electronic and optical equipment (DL, in 
the following referred to as “electronics and optical equipment”), chemicals, 
chemical products and man-made fibers (DG, in the following called 
“chemicals”) and transport equipment (DM). The first two groups each 
accounted for about one-fifth of Russian imports from the EU-25. Given the 
inherited production structure, both groups could be important factors in the 
development of Russia’s own competing non-fuel industry.
In mining and quarrying (C), only non-energy producing material (CB) was 
imported from the EU-25. Russia was fully self-sufficient in the mining 
and quarrying of energy products (CA). The monthly time series in Russian 
industrial production volume data do not distinguish between CA and CB; 
we therefore only compare total mining and quarrying production with 


















































































































































105 Results: EU-25 Import CompetitionChart 3 shows the structure of Russia’s industrial production. Mining and 
quarrying is by far the largest group, corresponding to nearly one-fifth of total 
production. Within this group the largest contribution to production comes 
from the energy sector. It should be noted that oil refining also plays a role in 
the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (DF, in 
the following called “energy”) as well as of chemicals. Energy and chemicals 
each account for about 5% to 6% of Russian industrial production. Accounting 
for nearly 18% of overall industrial output, the manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal products (DJ, in the following referred to as “metals”) 
has the second-largest share in production. These two categories mainly 
represent low value-added manufacturing. The manufacture of electricity, gas 
and water and the manufacture of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (DA, 
“food”), which account for about one-eighth of production each, have the 
third-largest share in production. While no import competition from the EU-25 
is registered for electricity, gas and water, food is the largest industrial branch 
in Russia that really has to compete with imports. Other significant industrial 
clusters are the manufacture of machinery and equipment, electronics and 
optical equipment, and transport equipment, each accounting for around 4% 
of production. The output of other industrial clusters was very small. Total 
production growth has been slow over the last few years.
Chart 4 presents the ratio of imports from the EU-25 to total domestic 
production in Russia. In 2005 and 2006 imports from the EU-25 exceeded 
domestic production in the manufacture of leather, leather products and shoes 
(DC, “leather products”), electronic and optical equipment, and machinery 
and equipment. Imports from the EU-25 have reached a level of about 80% 
of Russian production in the manufacture of textiles and textile products (DB, 
“textiles”). In most of the above-mentioned categories, import penetration has 
rapidly increased in recent years.
Imports from the EU-25 are marginal or modest in categories like mining and 
quarrying, metals, other nonmetallic mineral products (DI), value-added wood 
and wood products (DD, “wood products”) and food. Of these categories, 
mining and quarrying, metals, nonmetallic mineral products and wood 
products are all natural resource clusters or booming sectors, while only food 
is clearly a “lagging sector.” With imports from the EU-25 corresponding to 
between 30% and 60% of domestic production, all other categories record 
a clear trend toward increasing import penetration.
Chart 5 shows sectoral import and production growth. The chart show that in 
all the above-mentioned industrial branches except energy, a sector in which 

























































































tChart 5 Production and Imports of Industrial Clusters* (2002–2006)
Source: Eurostat, Rosstat
108  Results: EU-25 Import CompetitionRussia is largely self-sufficient and EU import competition is marginal. We 
see that imports grow significantly faster than domestic production in all 
categories except food and electronic and optical equipment. Food production 
increases almost at the same pace as imports, which shows that food is an 
industry where domestic enterprises are doing relatively well. Corresponding 
to between 12% and 13% of domestic production in volume terms, imports 
from the EU-25 are still significantly smaller than domestic production. Most 
of the larger food import categories are in fact complements
10 of which Russia 
does not have its own production. Moreover, high import duties on most 
foodstuffs partly limit import growth. In general, the Russian food industry is 
among the industries that are most strictly protected from foreign competition 
by various means; customs duties were 15% on average in mid-2006.
11
The situation is different for electronic and optical equipment, as both domestic 
production and imports in this sector have grown fast in recent years. Imports 
from the EU-25, however, clearly exceed domestic production. These imports 
mainly comprise mobile phones and mobile phone parts (about one-fourth), 
computer parts, and consumer electronics. However, most of the commodities 
in this sector are high-value consumer goods Russia itself does not produce. 
The respective import duties averaged 10% during the observation period.
In most of the other categories, imports have nearly doubled or even tripled 
since the beginning of 2002, with machinery and equipment recording the 
fastest import growth. Imports have expanded threefold since 2002, while 
domestic production rose only little. Machinery and equipment imports from 
the EU-25 are quite heterogeneously distributed between various categories. 
One can argue that imports increase as machinery and equipment is needed 
to develop the domestic manufacturing sector and equip households with 
appliances. However, Russia could supply goods from domestic production in 
many of these categories. The development in the machinery and equipment 
category in Russia gives reason for concern, as imports have grown so fast. 
The sectoral import duty was 12% on average in mid-2006. Growth trends 
are also worrying for leather products, whose domestic production has grown 
10 Complements are materials/goods that complement domestically produced goods, as 
opposed to substitutes, which replace domestically produced goods.
11 Russia uses various trade barriers like import duties, product certificates and quotas to 
protect especially the food industry from foreign competition. It is difficult, however, to measure 
the quantitative effect of the various trade barriers, which is why our focus here is exclusively 
on average import duties given the availability of the relevant data which should also indicate 
a general level of protection for certain industries. Customs duties remained quite stable during 
the period under observation; the average Russian import tariff was about 12% to 13% in 2006. 
References to customs duties below are taken from Simola (2007).
109 Results: EU-25 Import Competitionmodestly and whose imports have nearly doubled since 2002. The ratio of 
imports from the EU-25 to domestic production in this sector was highest in 
early 2006 at 140%. It is rather difficult in this case, however, to distinguish 
between luxury goods and standard consumer goods. The average import duty 
for leather products was 11%.
In the textiles sector, the import ratio expanded from 40% of the domestic 
production level in early 2003 to 80% in late 2005. Textiles was the only 
category where domestic production went down in the period from 2002 to 
2005. The distribution of imports was also quite heterogeneous. Some of the 
categories clearly qualify as complements or special articles – categories 
in which Russia does not have its own competing production. The average 
customs fee for textiles was 12%. Moreover, most of textiles imports to 
Russia come from Asia, not Europe, and hence the comparison with EU-25 
export data does not give a full picture of import competition in this sector.
Import growth was more restrained in wood products, pulp, paper and paper 
products (DE, in the following called “paper”) and transport equipment – 
categories in which imports from EU-25 countries have grown more modestly 
(i.e. by less than 100%) since 2002. In the sector of wood products, imports 
from the EU-25 correspond to around 15% of Russian domestic production, 
which is still of low quality and developing slowly. Given that Russia’s wood 
reserves are among the largest worldwide, however, the economic potential 
for wood products is obvious. The average customs duty for imports in these 
categories was 13%. Paper imports from the EU-25 correspond to about 30% 
of the domestic production level. Russia purchases a lot of paper abroad in 
order to satisfy domestic demand for paper products (especially newspapers 
and journals), which is also visible in the structure of imports from the EU-25. 
Parts of Russia’s newspapers and journals are in fact printed outside the 
country as production quality is better abroad and production capacities in 
Russia are insufficient. Such a big consumption-driven cluster would leave 
ample potential for stepping up domestic production. The average customs 
duty in this category came to 11% in the period under review.
In transport equipment, import growth has been more moderate than in 
most other industrial clusters. In this category, the ratio of imports to 
domestic production reached 30% in early 2006. Interestingly, passenger 
cars accounted for over 40% of transport equipment imports from the EU-25 
in 2005; aircraft and spacecraft came to 14% and other vessels (including 
boats and ships) and parts accounted for the rest. According to reports by the 
Federal Customs Service, car imports, which are the main drivers of import 
110  Results: EU-25 Import Competitiongrowth, have doubled annually in recent years. The average import duty in 
the sector was 11% in mid-2006. However, duties were higher on a number 
of specific products such as passenger cars (coming to at least 25%), which 
might be an important reason for establishing car plants in Russia.
Arguably, energy, chemicals and nonmetallic mineral products could also 
be classified as belonging to the fuel sector. Domestic energy production 
has grown at a  slower pace than energy imports, which mainly comprise 
a variety of oils and – at a ratio of 30% to domestic output – do not constitute 
a serious threat to domestic production. The average energy customs duty 
was only 5%. The ratio of chemicals imports from the EU-25 to Russian 
domestic production grew from 40% to 60%. Accounting for about one-third 
of chemicals imports from the EU-25, medical products recorded the highest 
import shares. Most of the main subgroups in this sector are luxury goods 
Russia does not produce domestically (which is one of the reasons for the 
faster growth of imports). Although Russia has its own production in the 
medical sector, imports are clearly in the lead. The average customs duty 
for chemicals was 9%. In the area of nonmetallic mineral products, imports 
from the EU-25 corresponded to about 10% of domestic production. Various 
glassware accounted for one-third of imports, while various ceramics and 
half-fabricates accounted for the rest. In all these categories, Russia has the 
potential for significant domestic production. With import duties coming 
to about 16% in mid-2006, which is clearly above average, protection for 
nonmetallic mineral products is rather pronounced.
For rubber and plastic products (DH, “rubber and plastic” for short), the 
ratio of imports from the EU-25 to domestic output went up from 20% to 
40%. Here, the major categories of imports from the EU-25 were rubber 
tires, plastic plates, sheets, foil and film – in all these categories, competing 
domestic industries should exist. The average minimum import duty for 
rubber and plastic was 9% in mid-2006. For metals, the ratio of imports from 
the EU-25 to domestic production was about 5% and the import duty came to 
about 11% on average.
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Disease
Our approach showed that in the period from early 2002 to early 2006 
Russian imports grew significantly faster than domestic production in 
nearly all product categories. This trend partly reflects overall economic 
developments, given that total Russian import growth (in terms of volume) 
has been nearly three times faster than GDP expansion during this period. 
In many industrial clusters, the share of imports is still small compared 
with competing domestic production; moreover, the imported goods are 
not necessarily substitutes of domestic products. This means that in some 
categories there are reasons behind the strong import growth which are not 
related to changes in the competitive position of Russian manufacturers. In 
categories like leather products, machinery and equipment, and electronic and 
optical equipment, however, imports from the EU-25 alone exceed domestic 
production. Moreover, imports of textiles nearly equal domestic production. 
Import growth exceeds domestic production growth in all sectors except 
electronic and optical equipment.
This could, however, imply that electronic and optical equipment may be 
an infrequent but important example of Russian firms (so far) withstanding 
foreign competition in a  modern technological area. Textiles and leather 
products are marginal in total imports. Contrary to the situation of electronic 
and optical equipment, Russia’s competitiveness appears to be waning in the 
realm of the other major import component from the EU-25, machinery and 
equipment. One should point out, though, that a large share of machinery, 
equipment and electronics imports is accounted for by investment goods, 
which may help the country build up competitive industrial structures. 
The textiles sector is clearly deindustrializing, as domestic production is 
declining.
The trend observed in numerous other categories – paper, transport equipment, 
rubber and plastics, and chemicals – gives rise to concern. Import competition 
in wood products is still weak, but growing. By contrast, imports do not 
appear to threaten domestic production in mining and quarrying, energy, 
metals and nonmetallic mineral products. Also in food production, domestic 
industries are doing well. However, the foodstuffs branch is seen to benefit 
from one of the highest levels of Russian tariff protection. Russia’s WTO 
112accession process promises to force highly protected industries to gradually 
lower import duties, which should increase import competition and raise 
pressures to restructure in the medium term.
Unlike most earlier studies on the Dutch disease in Russia, we clearly find 
a trend of increased overall import competition. This result is derived using 
EU-25 trade data, which correspond to about one-half of Russia’s value-based 
imports. Total imports are therefore probably twice as large as indicated by 
our exercise. In our view, the observed tough import competition might be 
interpreted as a certain degree of the Dutch disease syndrome in many of 
the Russian industrial production sectors, especially in some important ones 
that might have the potential to drive economic diversification. This overall 
picture may correspond to an incipient deindustrialization process that affects 
large parts of manufacturing.
However, our approach is limited in a  number of ways. First, we are 
only examining what we see as the last link of the hypothetical causality 
chain of the Dutch disease theory. This last link may be exposed to other 
influences lying outside the causality chain. For example, Russia’s strongly 
rising average income levels in recent years have obviously contributed to 
making higher quality imports more easily accessible to the average Russian 
population. Second, it is still difficult to distinguish between substitutes 
and complementary products, as this would require more detailed industrial 
output data. Third, the time span under review is rather short. Fourth, we do 
not have full volume-based data on total Russian imports.
Despite these limitations, we show that – based on the simple Dutch disease 
theory of import competition versus domestic production – Russia has 
reasons to worry. Of course, higher competition and rising purchases of 
capital equipment may contribute to improving the productivity of domestic 
production and to boosting Russia’s competitiveness in the medium and long 
term. Mounting import competition in recent years may also largely reflect 
some structural adjustment related to Russia’s transition and continuing 
integration into the global market.
However, such strong import growth against much slower growth in domestic 
production is not sustainable in the long term if Russia wants to diversify its 
production structure from being predominantly natural resource-intensive 
to focusing more on value-added manufacturing. The question of how to 
tackle the current challenge will therefore partly depend on how successful 
policymakers manage the macroeconomic developments and how effectively 
113 Conclusions: Russia Shows Symptoms of the Dutch Diseasethey use the buffers created by the tight fiscal policy in recent years when oil 
prices were high. So far, their overall record in this regard is quite respectable. 
Notwithstanding Russia’s recent redemption of its entire Soviet-era foreign 
debt from its stabilization fund means, the fund doubled in size in the course 
of 2006. Curtailment of domestic demand through taxing and sterilizing 
oil-related proceeds has doubtlessly contributed to countering Dutch disease 
pressures.
The outcome will also depend on the way in which policymakers handle 
structural adjustments and on how the investment climate evolves. An 
improvement of the Russian business environment could contribute to 
helping curb or contain the Dutch disease. In addition, increased integration 
to the world economy, induced by Russia’s WTO accession, would probably 
force domestic manufacturing to become more competitive and offer new 
markets in the medium and long term. In the short term, however, import 
growth would speed up if customs tariffs were abolished.
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1. Energy prices and inflation
Are increases in commodity and energy prices inflationary? The answer 
seems to be obvious: yes, of course, commodity and energy prices are 
important components of production costs. As costs increase, output prices 
are necessarily pushed upwards, thus creating inflationary pressures. QED.
Actually, things are not quite that simple. An increase in commodity and energy 
prices represents a change in relative prices, not necessarily in the price level. 
Indeed, what about the prices of other goods and services? They might well 
fall. As people spend more money on gasoline, they may have to cut back on 
other expenditures, such as restaurant meals or clothing, thus inducing some 
prices to fall, or at least to increase less rapidly. In the context of the quantity 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the SUERF/BWG Workshop and Special 
East Jour Fixe in Vienna on Commodities, Energy and Finance, Austrian National Bank, 
Vienna, March 3, 2008. I am grateful to the organizers and participants for their comments and 
suggestions.
119theory of money, for instance, for a given money supply, a constant velocity, 
and full employment, I would not expect to see an increase in the price level 
at all. Some prices will go up and others will come down, but the price level 
should remain unchanged.
Of course, this is merely a  first approximation based on an exceedingly 
simple model. Reality is more complicated. Activity and velocity need not 
be constant. If some prices are sticky downwards, they might fail to decrease 
sufficiently to offset the increase in the prices of commodities and energy. 
This might impact negatively on activity, and thus, if activity does indeed 
decline as a consequence of the higher commodity and energy prices, the 
price level might well rise, even for an unchanged money supply. As for 
velocity, it might well increase as a result of changing expectations about 
future developments in the price level.
One must keep in mind, though, that even if one admits that an increase in 
commodity and energy prices will tend to increase the price level, this does 
not mean that it will lead to inflation. A once-for-all increase in the price level 
is not the same thing as inflation. Inflation means a steady and continuous 
increase in the price level, not a once-for-all jump in it. Admittedly, we do 
not measure the price level continuously, and thus it is difficult in practice 
to distinguish a stepwise increase in the price level from a sustained one. 
Nonetheless, the conceptual difference exists and should be kept in mind.
In any case, I do not want to suggest that an increase in commodity and energy 
prices does not tend to lead to at least a temporary increase in inflation, but 
I think it is important to remember that we are nonetheless dealing foremost 
with a real – rather than a nominal – shock, and that its inflationary impact 
ought to be limited. Typically, as energy and commodity prices increase, other 
relative prices must adjust. I earlier mentioned production activities. If energy 
becomes relatively more expensive, other inputs, such as perhaps labour, 
must become relatively cheaper. Real adjustments are needed. Real wages 
may have to come down. 
120  Energy prices and inflation2. The monetary policy response
One advantage of assessing a change in the commodity and energy prices 
as a relative price shock, rather than an inflationary shock, is that it shows 
exactly where the responsibilities lie with regard to inflation: clearly, the 
buck stops at the central bank. The reaction of the monetary authorities will 
be crucial in determining whether the commodity and energy price increase 
will indeed be inflationary.
If the central bank validates the price increase, so to speak, and opposes 
the real adjustments that are needed, then the commodity and energy price 
increase might well trigger an inflationary spiral, but it is monetary policy that 
would be at fault. This is pretty much what happened in the 1970s following 
the first oil price shock.
What should monetary policy then do? Should it oppose the price increase? 
Before answering that question, it might be useful to first briefly address 
another question: is a commodity or energy price increase a supply shock or 
a demand shock? The answer is: it could be either.
Consider first a closed economy (e.g. the world economy). The price increase 
could reflect an increase in demand, or it could be due to a fall in supply. Many 
people believe today that the current increase in commodity and energy prices 
has to do with the rapid growth of emerging market economies, particularly 
China and India. Some observers, tough, also point at some supply factors, 
such as political instability in some oil producing nations. Speculation is often 
mentioned as an additional demand factor, although it is difficult to see how 
it could play a lasting role given the large cost of carrying inventories in most 
instances.
What about open economies, and particularly small, non energy and 
commodity producing, open economies, such as Austria and Switzerland? 
It does not really matter what causes the worldwide increase in the prices of 
commodities and energy as far as these economies are concerned, for either 
way they take the form of a  negative supply shock – more precisely, an 
adverse terms-of-trade shock –  that tends to reduce activity and put upward 
pressure on prices.
121Monetary policy is then caught in a dilemma. If monetary policy is used to 
oppose the increase in the price level, it will tend to slow down the economy 
even further. If monetary policy becomes more expansionary in order to fight 
the slowdown, it will reinforce the price increase. Most central bankers would 
therefore argue in such a case that monetary policy should react with caution. 
It should not necessarily fight the initial price increase, but it should ensure 
that it does not feed into expectations, for this could trigger an inflationary 
spiral.
The fact remains that a  worsening in the terms of trade is a  real shock 
that inevitably reduces economic welfare. In many ways, this similar to 
a technological  regress: you get less for more. It reduces real domestic 
income, even though real gross domestic product (GDP) as it is conventionally 
measured will fail to register it.
2 Thus, there is no way around it: some, if not 
all, real factor rewards must decline, and there is nothing that monetary policy 
can do to avoid it.
2 Real GDP will even register an increase if it is measured, as it is still the case in most 
countries, by a Laspeyres quantity index, whether chained or not; see Kohli (2004).
122  The monetary policy response3. The measurement of inflation
What about the measurement of inflation? If it is unavoidable that increases 
in commodity and energy prices will have at least a temporary effect on the 
price level, shouldn’t central banks pay more attention to core inflation – that 
might exclude energy prices – rather than to headline inflation? I do not think 
that there is a generally accepted answer to this question. I personally believe, 
though, that the main emphasis should be on headline inflation, and this for 
at least two reasons. First, if the prime objective of monetary policy is to 
safeguard the purchasing power of money, then it must be all inclusive. One 
must look at the price of the entire basket of goods and services, not just part of 
it. In a way, this is again a debate about relative prices vs. absolute prices. If the 
core inflation rate is measured by excluding some goods from the basket, like 
energy and food, then one is no longer considering the general price level, but 
merely a subcomponent of it. The second reason has to do with communication. 
At a time of rapidly increasing energy and food prices, how can central banks 
convince the public that they are successful in achieving price stability, if they 
focus on what some people call the “cold and hungry” index? Energy and food 
prices are among the most visible ones for the population, and leaving them out 
is simply not credible.
One might argue that core indexes are better measures of the current trend of 
price developments than the headline index, which tends to be quite volatile. 
That might well be true, and indeed at the Swiss National Bank we compute and 
use a number of core indexes, such as trimmed mean indexes, a dynamic factor 
index, and indexes that exclude food, energy, and in some cases administered 
prices. These indexes are part of our tool box, and we observe them closely. 
Nonetheless, we should not take it for granted that they will always be better 
indicators of current developments, at a time when energy and food prices 
have been trending upwards for several years. It might well be, as argued 
earlier, that commodity and energy prices are increasing because of the strong 
demand from fast growing emerging market economies, but globalization has 
other consequences too, such as the falling prices of industrialized products 
on world markets. Thus, if food and energy prices are to be left out from the 
measurement of the price level, shouldn’t one exclude the prices of cheap 
Chinese imports as well? Clearly, if one takes out all the prices that increase 
or decrease, what will be left will look fairly flat. That might look reassuring, 
but it might also be an illusion. As for the capability of core indexes to forecast 
future headline inflation, I  have seen no convincing empirical evidence 
supporting that hypothesis.
1234. Commodities and energy as an asset class
It is often argued that commodities and energy should really be viewed as an 
asset class. Moreover, there are economists who contend that monetary policy 
should react to – or even target – asset prices, in order to prevent bubbles 
from developing. This then begs the question: should monetary policy target 
commodity prices? Should monetary policy react if there is a commodity price 
bubble in the making? Ironically this would be almost exactly the opposite of 
the policy that I briefly reviewed earlier, i.e. targeting a core price index that 
excludes commodity and energy prices. I would certainly argue against this 
policy course as well. How can one be sure that the commodity price increase 
is due to a speculative bubble, rather than to legitimate economic forces? Are 
central bankers better placed than market participants to call a bubble? When 
Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, gave 
his famous “irrational exuberance” warning in December 1996, the Dow 
Jones was trading at around 7,500. It then went on increasing to peak at over 
11,700 in January 2000, before falling back to around 7,300 in October 2002. 
By then end of 2003, the Dow had returned to the 10,000 level, and it broke 
the 13,000 mark in January 2007. While there is no arguing in hindsight that 
a stock market bubble did indeed develop, it is certainly debatable whether 
it was called at the right time. Furthermore, there is always the risk that 
a  policy intervention would be counterproductive, due to unforeseen side 
effects, unknown lags, and so on. And if one were to target asset prices, why 
focus on commodity prices, rather than say, equity prices, real estate prices, 
bond prices, or foreign exchange rates? Admittedly, there is one important 
historical precedent one should mention, and that is the gold standard regime, 
when monetary policy was indeed directed at maintaining constant the price 
of gold. In the late nineteenth century, policy was successful in fixing the 
price of gold, but at the cost of large swings in the cost of living. Luckily, 
no one seriously proposes to turn the clock back and to return to the gold 
standard.
1245. Back to price stability
In my view, given the multitude of existing assets and the fact that the central 
bank ultimately only has one independent instrument at its disposal, it should 
concentrate on maintaining constant the price of the one asset that it is closest 
to, namely money, and thus it should focus on keeping the real price of money 
constant. While the nominal price of money is unity, the real price of money is 
one divided by the price level. Thus, seeking to keep the real price of money 
steady is exactly the same as maintaining price stability, which is what central 
banks should be doing all along.
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Energy and commodity prices have risen rapidly in recent years. This is largely 
due to emerging markets such as China and India becoming increasingly 
integrated into the global economy – what one often means when talking 
about globalisation. At the same time, globalisation has entailed low prices 
for imported products from emerging markets, and via stiffer competition has 
contributed to curbing the price increases for import-competing products in 
industrial countries. This has made it easier for the central banks to maintain 
price stability. For some considerable time the economic discussion focused 
on the inflation dampening effect of globalisation. The challenge facing 
some central banks, such as the Riksbank which I represent, was rather how 
to stimulate economies by means of monetary policy in order to push up 
inflation towards the target.
However it would now seem that globalisation has instead begun to push 
up inflation, as increasing demand from emerging markets pushes up world 
market prices not just for energy and metals but also for food commodities. 
Perhaps it is only now that the low inflation policy, which to all appearances 
has been conducted so successfully in many countries, is being put to the 
test.
How then, is inflation affected by rising energy and commodity prices 
and how should monetary policy deal with such price movements? The 
principles for this are essentially simple when applying so-called flexible 
inflation targeting. It means that the central bank tries to stabilise inflation 
129around the inflation target and, provided that confidence in the inflation 
target is maintained, also gives consideration to stabilising production and 
employment. Another and more concrete way of describing this is that the 
central bank tries to find a path for the policy rate which will ensure that the 
forecasted inflation rate is reasonably close to the target at the same time as 
the real economy develops in a balanced manner. These universal principles 
can be applied regardless of the nature of the shock facing the economy. In 
this sense, one could say that rises in energy and commodity prices do not 
pose any specific problem from a monetary policy point of view – in many 
ways it is a case of ‘business as usual’.
But even if the principles for the way in which monetary policy should be 
conducted are simple in theory, the practical implementation is far from 
simple. An assessment must be made of the way in which rises in energy 
and commodity prices affect the economy, not only inflation but also the 
real economy. An increase in energy and commodity prices can affect the 
economy in various ways. The price increases have a direct effect in that 
energy and food, for instance, are included in the inflation measure. But the 
real economy is also affected indirectly. For households, higher energy prices 
act roughly like a tax increase and curb domestic demand.
A  more rapid increase in energy and commodity prices means that the 
production costs increase. The effect can be compared to the one that follows 
from a drop in productivity. It tends to dampen production and growth. At 
the same time, the rise in energy prices in recent years has, to a far greater 
extent than the rises in the 1970s and 1980s, been fuelled by strong demand 
in the world market rather than by supply shocks. The negative effects on the 
real economy of the rapid rise in energy prices have been wholly or partially 
counteracted by favourable price developments in other areas and by strong 
international growth. Thus it is not possible to give a standard answer as to 
how monetary policy should react to an increase in energy and commodity 
prices. Each shock must be analysed separately and the question of which 
policy is most appropriate must be determined from case to case.
What is characteristic to energy and commodity prices is that they tend to 
fluctuate considerably during an economic cycle. Periods with rapid price 
increases may be followed by periods of far calmer development or even by 
a decline in prices. These fluctuations also spread to consumers. Such rapid 
shifts in inflationary impulses are often impossible to predict and cannot be 
immediately counteracted by means of monetary policy. This is because of the 
lag in monetary policy’s impact on economic activity. It is, therefore, common 
130  Monetary policy and commodity and energy pricesin the monetary policy analysis that, over and above the more comprehensive 
inflation measures, central banks also study inflation measures that exclude 
short-term effects in energy and commodity prices. In my view, this is not 
a question of whether there is reason to disregard energy and commodity 
prices when balancing monetary policy. Instead, it is a question of trying to 
differentiate between those price impulses that risk having a lasting effect on 
inflation and those that are temporary and which will ebb away without any 
forceful monetary policy counter-measures.
The way in which the practical monetary policy should react to rising energy 
and commodity prices is a question that the Riksbank, like many other central 
banks, is grappling with at present. In Sweden rising energy and food prices 
contributed to inflation increasing rapidly in autumn 2007. CPI inflation is 
currently more than one percentage point above the target of 2 per cent. In 
particular with regard to energy, but also to a large extent food, the rapid 
increase in prices reflects a  substantial rise in world market prices. The 
assessments that need to be made in this type of situation have to do with the 
extent to which the effects will last, as well as how much the price increases 
have to do with increased demand and changes in supply. 
In the forecast presented in connection with the monetary policy meeting at 
the Riksbank in mid-February the assessment was that world market prices 
would not continue to rise at the same rapid rate in the future. The inflationary 
impulses are therefore considered mainly to be temporary and inflation is 
therefore expected to fall back again in a year or two. But to some extent it 
also concerns effects on inflation which risk being more permanent and which 
should be counteracted by monetary policy.
It is also very important that confidence in monetary policy and the inflation 
target is maintained. The fact that inflation is above the target must be regarded 
as a temporary departure. The inflationary impulses cannot be allowed to take 
root in the economy and to push up inflation permanently. In this context, it is 
important to be particularly vigilant with regard to how inflation expectations 
develop. In Sweden, by means of specific surveys, we continuously monitor 
developments in inflation expectations among different social groups and 
with varying time horizons. These surveys reveal that inflation expectations 
have risen recently, not just in the short-term but in the long-term as well. In 
addition to continued good growth and high cost pressures, this was a key 
reason that justified the decision to raise the repo rate in February.
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Over the past five years, the price of oil and non-energy commodities in euros 
has increased by significantly more than 60 percent (See Figure 2 below). 
This has put upward pressure on consumer price inflation. How should central 
banks respond to those price changes? At a  general conceptual level, the 
consensus view is simple: Modern central banks like the European Central 
Bank that focus on maintaining price stability in the medium term should 
work out what the implications are of those relative price changes for the risks 
to price stability and respond accordingly. To the extent that such relative price 
changes are expected to have only temporary effects on headline inflation, the 
central bank can look through them and does not need to respond. Because 
energy and commodity prices are typically highly volatile and flexible, it is 
often argued that central banks should focus on price indices that exclude 
those components, so-called core inflation indices. However, if those price 
changes risk unhinging private sector inflation expectations from the central 
bank’s medium-term objective and lead to second-round effects on prices and 
wages, a less accommodative monetary policy response to the incipient rise 
in headline inflation is warranted. In practice, the policy response therefore 
depends on a number of factors such as the source and the persistence of the 
price changes and the overall macroeconomic environment, which prevents 
a simple mechanistic approach as suggested by exclusively focusing on core 
inflation measures. Moreover, whether shocks to commodity prices have 
1 The views expressed in this contribution are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the European Central Bank.
135short-lived effects on inflation will depend on the expected policy response 
and therefore should not be treated as exogenous to monetary policy. 
In this panel contribution, I  make six points that have a  bearing on the 
implications of energy and commodity price changes for price stability and 
on how central banks should respond to such changes. First, over the past ten 
years energy prices have persistently grown by more than the average price 
level, while other prices have persistently fallen. Such persistent relative price 
changes are an important feature of the market mechanism, which monetary 
policy can not and should not do anything about. However, given the relatively 
large weight of energy in the consumption basket, it also implies that excluding 
such price changes from the targeted consumer price index would lead to 
a systematic upward bias in headline price inflation and the cost of living. 
Second, for a net importer like the euro area economy increases in energy and 
commodity prices push up import prices and therefore lead to a deterioration 
of the terms-of-trade. Such negative terms-of-trade developments are akin 
to negative productivity shocks, which make euro area residents poorer. 
The response of the equilibrium real interest rate will depend on whether 
the negative supply effects coming from rising marginal costs outweigh the 
negative demand effects coming from reduced income and wealth. Third, 
the source of the rise in energy prices matters for its inflation implications. 
Empirical evidence has highlighted that the recent energy prices are mostly 
driven by a world-wide increase in the demand for energy, partly due to the 
rapid growth of China and India. Such demand-driven price increases may 
have different implications for the outlook for price stability from changes 
in oil prices driven by supply disruptions. Fourth, there is evidence that the 
inflationary effects of a given oil price increase have declined in the euro area. 
Fifth, it is important to take the source of this reduced effect into account. 
To the extent that the reduction is due to the improved credibility of a low 
and stable inflation regime and increased real wage flexibility, these factors 
need to be monitored in calibrating the policy response. The role of anchored 
inflation expectations in reducing the pass-through also points to the fact that 
it is generally difficult to distinguish first from second-round effects. Finally, 
in the euro area exclusion-based measures of core inflation are not very good 
predictors of underlying headline inflation. In the next few pages, I briefly 
elaborate on each of these points.
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price level, but other prices have persistently fallen.  
Most changes in energy and commodity prices are relative price changes 
that reflect the working of the market mechanism in bringing the supply 
and demand for energy and commodities in equilibrium. In a  dynamic 
setting, these price changes also help bringing about an efficient allocation 
of resources. For example, to the extent that the recent increase in energy 
prices reflects the increasing shortage of mineral energy sources and low 
inventory levels, the price increases will help stimulate new investment both 
in exploring new oil fields and in alternative forms of energy. Central banks 
can not and should not affect those relative price changes as it is likely to 
interfere with the efficient allocation of resources. In this sense, changes in 
energy prices are not different from changes in the prices of other goods and 
services.
Figure 1: Components of producer and consumer price inflation in the euro area
Figure 1 exhibits the average price changes of selected components of the 
producer and the consumer price index over the past 10 years. Two comments 
are worth making. First, the left panel shows that the producer price of energy 
has increased on average by more than 2.5 percentage points more relative 
to the overall producer price index over the past ten years. In contrast, both 
consumer and capital goods have on average increased by less. Similarly at 
the retail level, the prices of liquid fuels, heat energy and gas have on average 
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telephone and information processing equipment prices have on average 
fallen by at least as much in absolute value. Clearly, these large relative price 
changes have been persistent and reflect relative productivity and demand 
factors. Seen from this perspective, it is not clear why one should exclude 
prices that have been rising faster than average and not exclude those that 
have been falling. Obviously, doing so would lead to a persistent upward bias 
in the cost of living.
Persistent changes in energy and commodity prices affect the terms 
of trade and the wealth of the euro area.
The euro area is a net importer of oil and commodities. The recent rise in 
energy and commodity prices has therefore led to a deterioration of the euro 
area’s terms of trade. Figure 2 shows that since 2003 non-energy commodities 
have increased by almost 70 percent, while the price of oil has increased by 
90 percent. In contrast, prices of manufacturing imports have increased by 
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Figure 2: Extra-euro area import and commodity prices
Notes: Indices: 2003M1=100, 3-month moving average. All prices are in euro.
Sources: ECB, HWWA, Eurostat . Reproduced from Trichet (2008).much less than general price inflation, partly reflecting the lower prices of 
imports from China and other Asian economies. 
Negative terms-of-trade shocks are like negative productivity shocks: they 
make a nation poorer. Rising import costs lead to an increase in marginal 
costs and a reduction in output either directly through a rise in the costs of 
intermediate inputs or indirectly through the rise in producer wages relative 
to consumer wages. Ultimately, the increase in marginal costs has to be 
compensated by a reduction in real wages. Rising import prices therefore 
also reduce real incomes and have negative wealth effects which will tend to 
reduce demand. Whether in the short term the equilibrium real interest rate 
has to fall or rise in response to rising import prices depends on whether the 
demand or supply effects dominate. This will in turn depend on a number 
of factors such as the perceived persistence of the shocks. If the current 
rise in imported energy and commodity prices is perceived to be persistent, 
then households may feel permanently poorer and may reduce demand 
significantly. In that case, the equilibrium real interest rate may stay put or 
could even fall. However, to the extent that there is real wage resistance, this 
may not be the case and real rates may have to rise in equilibrium.
The source of energy and commodity price changes matters for the 
outlook for price stability.
Recent research (e.g. Killian (2008) and Baumeister and Peersman (2008)) 
has shown that the source of oil price changes may have changed over the 
past decade. Using a time-varying VAR model, Baumeister and Peersman 
(2008) distinguish between oil supply and demand shocks by imposing 
sign restrictions: i.e. supply shocks move production and prices in opposite 
directions, while demand shocks move them in the same direction. They find 
that the frequency and the size of supply shocks have fallen over the past two 
decades, but the demand elasticity has increased. As a result, a given supply 
disruption leads to larger price changes. In contrast, world demand shocks 
have become more important and most of the recent price hikes are due to an 
increase in world demand for energy. 
The source of oil price changes is important because the overall effects on 
domestic inflation may be different depending on the source. In particular, 
to the extent that the current rise in energy prices is related to the increasing 
demand for energy coming from China and India, one should take into account 
that there are offsetting effects. For example, as mentioned earlier, the prices 
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been estimated that this has contributed to 2 percentage points lower average 
inflation in import prices since 1999. On the other hand, growth in China 
and India will also lead to an increase in the demand for exports from the 
euro area and this may give rise to increasing inflationary pressures (keeping 
everything else equal).
The estimated pass-through of oil prices into producer and consumer 
prices in the euro area has fallen
Recent research has shown that in many OECD countries the pass-through 
of oil prices into producer and consumer prices has fallen (e.g. Blanchard 
and Gali (2008), Baumeister and Peersman (2008), Hahn and Mestre 
(2008)). These findings are similar to the empirical evidence on the reduced 
pass-through of exchange rate changes over the past two decades. Table 1 
reports the elasticities of oil price changes on prices at various stages of 
production in the euro area based on rolling-window VAR estimations in 
Hahn (2008). The Table shows that the impact of a 1% increase in oil prices 
on other prices has fallen at all stages of production. While the direct effects 
on the consumer price index are still there, the indirect effects have fallen 
quite significantly. The elasticity on HICP ex energy after three years has 
fallen from 0.07 in the start sample to 0.01 in the end sample. Also the impact 
on producer and non-oil import prices has fallen considerably.
Table 1: Impact of a 1% increase in oil prices on euro area prices after 12 quarters
(deviation from baseline)





















Notes: 1) The results of the full sample refer to 1970Q2 – 2007Q1. 2) To ensure robustness, the results 
shown for the start, middle and end sample are averages of the estimates derived from 10 consecutive 
rolling window estimates. That is, the estimates for the start sample are averages over the 10 estimates 
derived from the data sample 1970Q2 – 1985Q1, and the nine following sample periods, by which the 
first and last period are moved stepwise by one quarter, i.e. the last sample period taken into account is 
1972Q3 – 1987Q2. The estimates of the middle and end samples are computed in the same way. For the 
middle sample estimates the first data window included is 1979Q4 – 1994Q3 and the last refers to 1982Q2 
– 1997Q1. For the end sample estimates the first data sample included is 1990Q1 – 2004Q4 and the last 
data sample is 1992Q2 – 2007Q1.
Source: Hahn (2008).
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Gali (2008) investigate which factors may have contributed to this fall in 
pass-through and conclude that in addition to a more favourable environment 
due to offsetting shocks and a lower energy content of production, two factors 
are likely to be important: the improved reputation of monetary policy makers 
for maintaining price stability and reduced real wage resistance. Both factors 
contribute to a lower pass-through of oil prices in headline inflation.
The sources of the reduced pass-through of oil prices are important 
for calibrating the policy response.
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) show that in an environment of imperfect 
knowledge and learning in expectation formation the monetary policy 
response to cost-push shocks will depend on factors like the perceived degree 
of inflation persistence by the private sector. Figure 3, which is taken from 
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006), illustrates the response of inflation and 
the output gap to a cost-push shock in a simple calibrated New Keynesian 
macro model where the private sector is learning about the inflation process 
by recursively running first-order autoregressive regressions on inflation and 
forms its inflation expectations accordingly. The various cases correspond to 
different initial levels of perceived inflation persistence.
Figure 3: Mean dynamics of output gap and inflation following a  one-standard 
deviation cost-push shock.
Notes: The different impulse responses refer to different starting values of the estimated degree of 
inflation persistence by the private sector.
Source: Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006)
Three comments are worth making. First, if the perceived inflation persistence 
is low (e.g. the private sector estimates that inflation returns to its target with 
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inflation and the output gap are lower and less persistent. This illustrates 
the benefits of a low and stable inflation regime. Both output and inflation 
volatility will be lower in such a regime. Second, if the perceived persistence 
is low, the central bank should respond only mildly to the cost-push shock. 
In contrast, if the perceived persistence is high, inflation expectations are not 
well anchored and give rise to second-round effects, the central bank should 
respond more aggressively and persistently. As shown in Gaspar, Smets and 
Vestin (2006), such a response will help in establishing a track record for low 
inflation and provide future benefits in the face of cost-push shocks. Third, 
the example illustrates that first-round effects (i.e. the immediate impact of 
a cost-push shock on inflation) depend on the perceived second-round effects, 
which will in turn depend on the monetary policy reaction. As shown by 
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006), in this environment a policy that does not 
let bygones be bygones will be powerful in reducing the actual and perceived 
persistence of the inflation response to cost-push shocks.
In the euro area, exclusion-based measures of core inflation are not 
good predictors of underlying headline inflation.
It has been argued that exclusion-based core inflation measures are useful 
indicators because they are good predictors of underlying inflation. Excluding 
volatile items such as energy and unprocessed food may indeed help 
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Table 2: Core inflation measures as predictors of underlying headline inflation 
    H=6   H=12
HICPX   1.13   1.60
HICPXX   1.11   1.72
Trimmed mean (5% each side)   1.24   1.26
Trimmed mean (16% each side)   1.25   1.34
Median   1.15   1.37
Eurocore   0.95   0.97
Notes: 1) HICPX is HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy; HICPXX is an ad-hoc permanent 
exclusion measure; Eurocore is based on a dynamic factor model estimated on the components of the 
HICP 2) The entries report the ratio of the RMSE over the RMSE of a benchmark (AR) model. Sample 
period: 1996:1 – 2005:10
Source: Lenza (2007)recovering the underlying inflation trend. However, as shown above, changes 
in energy prices have been quite persistent. Moreover, Vega and Wynne 
(2001) and Morana (2000) have investigated the forecasting properties of 
alternative core inflation measures in the euro area and have found that the 
HICP excluding food and energy scores badly. This measure is outperformed 
by basically all the other measures in out-of-sample forecasting exercises. 
Moreover, the HICP-ex does not improve on forecasts based only on lags of 
headline inflation. These results are also borne out in more recent empirical 
evidence produced by Lenza (2007), reported in Table 2.
Lenza (2007) shows that a dynamic factor model based on the components of 
the HICP is a better predictor of underlying inflation. Figure 4 illustrates why 
this is the case. In 2000, for example, the HICP-ex measure indicated lower 
inflation, while headline and underlying inflation was clearly higher. 
Figure 4: HICP and measures of underlying inflation
Source: Lenza (2007).
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